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INTRODUCTION
At the heart of the nearly sixty-year-old conflict between the 
United States and the Republic of Cuba lies the $1.9 billion U.S. claim 
against Cuba for the mass expropriation of American-owned property 
and assets in Cuba during the early years of the Cuban revolution.1
socialist revolution and uncompensated expropriation of U.S. 
* Please note that this article was written without direct knowledge of
the content of the current bi-lateral negotiations between the American and 
Cuban delegates.  The insights and other recommendations in this article arise 
from publicly available information, including statements made through media 
outlets, published works of experts and scholars, as well as my own personal 
experience as a Cuban-American born to Cuban political exiles.
** Joyce Rodriguez, Esquire obtained her J.D. from the Levin School 
of Law, University of Florida and L.L.M. in  International Law from the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Ms. Rodriguez
would like to thank her LL.M. capstone advisor, distinguished Professor 
Jeswald W. Salacuse, for his exceptional insight and guidance throughout the 
writing process.  
1 U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM N OF
THE U.S., SECTION II COMPLETION OF THE CUBAN CLAIMS PROGRAM UNDER
TITLE V OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1949, 69 (1972)
[hereinafter FCSC CUBAN REPORT]; U.S. DEP T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CLAIMS
SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE U.S., Completed Programs Cuba (Dec. 5, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba [hereinafter U.S.
DEP T OF JUSTICE].
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property initiated a series of events that have defined the decades-old 
stalemate between the countries.  The passage of time, however, has 
inevitably witnessed incremental but definitive changes to U.S.-Cuba 
relations.  Many of these changes have come to fruition in the past ten 
diplomatic relations with Cuba and the subsequent loosening of U.S. 
economic sanctions against Cuba.2 Although the Obama 
argue that these policy changes, along with the application of 
international law and the use of arbitration, may be strategically 
utilized to induce the Cuban government to settle the expropriated 
property claims. 
However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the U.S. will be 
able to resolve its legal claims against Cuba without also addressing 
shifts its negotiation 
strategy with Cuba towards resolving its expropriated-property claims 
against Cuba, Cuba will raise its own counterclaims against the U.S. 
arising from the embargo and alleged U.S. covert operations against 
Cuba.3 This in turn will trigger the U.S. to respond in kind and raise 
its claims against Cuba for its alleged covert operations against the 
U.S. and its nationals.4 Accordingly, this paper will address the 
2 See President Barrack Obama, Statement by the President on Cuba 
Policy Changes (Dec. 17, 2014), available at 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/
statement-president-cuba-policy-changes. Most of these changes have 
Adam 
Fisher, place,
ABC News (Jun. 17, 2017, 4:09 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
trumps-cuba-policy/story?id=48058622.
3 See, e.g.,  U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., annex, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/46/193 
(Aug. 19, 1991).
4 See, e.g., Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253
54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (arising from Cuban Government directing Air Force to 
shoot down two unarmed civilian airplanes over international waters on 
February 24, 1996, where district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and 
awarded them compensatory damages of $49,927,911 against the Cuban 
Government and Cuban Air Force, as well as punitive damages of 
$137,700,000 against the Cuban Air Force alone).
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resolution of the U.S. expropriated-property claims against Cuba as 
well as other potential legal claims each country will likely raise 
against the other in their diplomatic negotiations. 
This paper will argue that international law and precedent provide 
the U.S. and Cuba with valuable tools, as well as a legitimate and fair 
framework to resolve many of their legal claims against each other.  
The first section will explore the changing relationship between the 
U.S. and Cuba, outline internal changes in each country, and argue that 
the time is ripe for resolution of their legal claims.  The next section 
will examine the measures taken by Cuba to nationalize U.S. property, 
review the measures taken by the U.S. to enforce the embargo against 
Cuba, and show that the validity of the measures can be fairly 
evaluated by applying international law principles.  The third section 
will examine how the U.S. and Cuba have resolved similar claims in 
the past.  The paper will then analyze two of the most comprehensive 
and creative scholarly proposals for the settlement of the U.S. claims 
against Cuba to point out their advantages and disadvantages.  Finally, 
the paper will conclude by providing a new forward-looking proposal 
for the resolution of outstanding legal claims between the U.S. and 
Cuba that accounts for current political and economic realities. 
I.  
THE TIME IS RIPE FOR RESOLUTION  
OF THE LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
The hostile U.S.-Cuba relationship is rooted in the Cold War.  On 
January 8, 1959, Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement entered 
Havana and  revolutionary forces took power in Cuba.5  From 
1959 1963, Castro directed the expropriation of nearly all private 
                                                           
 
5  See ESTABAN MORALES DOMINGUEZ & GARY PROVOST, UNITED 
STATES CUBAN RELATIONS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 38 (2008). 
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property on the island.6  These measures are discussed more 
thoroughly in the next section.  However, it is important to note that 
despite the illusory nature of the compensation schemes set forth in 
ultimate failure to pay 
any compensation for the exporpriations, the Cuban government did 
attempt to negotiate settlement options with the U.S. government as 
early as September and December 1959.7  
early indication that the new Cuban government was willing to 
negotiate  was rebuffed by the U.S.8  The U.S. corporations that did 
engage in settlement discussions with the Cuban government were 
unable to come to an agreement for fear of losing their future property 
claims if the Castro government was eventually removed from power.9  
Thus, the futility of settling the U.S. expropriation claims through 
diplomacy alone was evident as early as 1959. 
A. THE HISTORICAL BREAK IN RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
As formalized trade relations with the 
Soviet Union, expropriated U.S.-owned properties, and increased 
taxes on U.S. imports, the U.S. responded with escalating economic 
penalties.10  After the U.S. significantly decreased Cuban sugar 
imports, [o]
                                                           
 
6  See Bradley Gilmore, U.S.-Cuba Compensation Policy, 8 TEX. HISP. 
J. L. & POL Y 79, 81 (2002).  
7  See Timothy Ashby, U.S. Certified Claims Against Cuba: Legal 
Reality and Likely Settlement Mechanism, 40 U. MIAMI INTER. AM. L. REV. 
413, 419 (2009).  
8         See, MICHAEL W. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATION 7 (1976). 
9  See Ashby, supra note 7, at 420. 
10  Claire Felter & Danielle Renwick, U.S.-Cuba Relations, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (last updated January 19, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/ 
backgrounder/us-cuba-relations. 
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to leave the island.11  Two days later, the United States announced the 
formal breaking of diplomatic relations with the Cuban government.12 
A few months later, on April 15, a U.S. aircraft bombed three 
airports in Cuba.13  Cuban mercenaries armed and trained by the U.S. 
landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17 but were defeated by the Cuban 
army.14  This was the catalyst for Castro  declaration of the socialist 
revolution.15  These events concretized the ensuing stalemate between 
the countries for decades to follow. 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the international community 
was shocked to discover the grave economic situation in Cuba.16  
Economic conditions in Cuba worsened when Cubans were deprived 
of the basic food and necessities usually imported from the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe.17  
vulnerable state to increase economic pressure on the Castro 
government.18  Instead of yielding to this pressure, the Cuban 
government responded to its economic downturn with a series of 
internal economic changes affecting its property laws in an effort to 
attract new and much needed foreign investment.19  The revival of 
foreign investment in Cuba was viewed by the United States as a threat 
to its legal claims to previously-expropriated property.20  More 
stringent requirements for lifting the U.S. embargo came after four 
Cuban-Americans were killed when a Brothers to the Rescue plane 
                                                           
11  Gilmore, supra note 6, at 84.  
12  See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 49. 
13  See id. 
14  See id. 
15  See JONATHON D. ROSEN & HANNA S. KASSAB, U.S. CUBA 
RELATIONS CHARTING A NEW PATH 61 (2016). 
16  See Andrew Zimbalist, Treading Water: Cuba's Economic and 
Political Crisis, in CUBA AND THE FUTURE 7, 7-11 (Donald E. Schulz ed., 
1994). 
17  See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 99. 
18  See id. at 104. 
19  See Zimbalist, supra note 16, at 11. 
20  See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST supra note 5, at 107. 
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was shot down by Cuban military in 1996.21  Determining that 
Fidel Castro had directly given the order to shoot down the plane, 
Congress sought to further increase the economic and trade restrictions 
against Cuba,  culminating in the passing of the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996.22 Among other wide-
expropriated property before the lifting of the embargo and created a 
property in Cuba.23  By 2001, the U.S. policy toward Cuba sought to 
compel a transition to democracy on the island through economic 
pressure.24  President George W. Bush maintained the same policies 
toward Cuba.25  The relationship between the U.S. and Cuba remained 
unchanged until 2008. 
B. THE START OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
President Barrack Obama 2016, marked a 
historical shift in U.S.-Cuba policy.26  In his first term, 
President 
remittances to Cuba, and allowed people-to-people exchanges.27  
                                                           
 
21  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 67. 
22  See Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-
Burton Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-91 (2012); see also 104 Cong. Rec. E271-04, 
S1510-02, S1479-04 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1996). 
23  See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6082(a)(1)(A). 
24  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 65-66; U.S. DEP T OF STATE, 
U.S.-CUBA RELATIONS, https://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/2558.htm (last visited Jun. 11, 2018). 
25  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 67. 
26  See CUBA STUDY GROUP, Restoring Executive Authority Over U.S. 
Policy Toward Cuba 4 (2013), 
http://www.cubastudygroup.org/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=45d8f827-
174c-4d43-aa2f-ef7794831032. 
27  See DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 129-50; see also infra 
Section II.C. (President Clinton had made some on these changes before the 
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However, it was not until December 2014 that President Obama 
Cuba, reopen the U.S. embassy, and remove Cuba from the list of state 
28   
Neither the American, nor Cuban people are well served by a 
rigid policy that is rooted in events that took place before 
most of us were born.  Consider that for more than 35 years, 
  a far larger country also 
governed by a Communist party.  Nearly two decades ago, 
we reestablished relations with Vietnam, where we fought a 
war that claimed more Americans than any Cold War 
confrontation.29 
to create democratic change in Cuba, instead of forcing democratic 
changes through external economic pressure and coercion.  
In May 2015, Cuba was removed from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism.30  The U.S. embassy in Cuba was reopened in August 
2015.31  Before leaving office, Obama also reversed the United 
long-
Cubans fleeing Cuba to legally immigrate to the U.S. and become U.S. 
citizens.32 
C. OTHER RECENT CHANGES 
Recently, there have been some changes in leadership in the 
Cuban government and the Cuban economic model.  In November 
                                                           
 
enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, and President Bush kept some of those 
changes but reversed some as well). 
28  ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 72. 
29  President Barrack Obama, supra note 2.  
30  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 73. 
31  Id. at 74. 
32  Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Frances Robles, U.S. Ends Special 
Treatment for Cuban Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), at A1.  
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2016, Fidel Castro died.  President Raul Castro stated that he would 
step down in 2018 and did so in April.33  Before stepping down, 
President Raul Castro changed some of the leadership in Cuba, and 
commenced the process of implementing a new economic reform 
plan.34
liberalization of its economy, including significant changes to its 
foreign investment laws.35  Some small private businesses are legal in 
Cuba, although the licensing process remains unpredictable.36  Cuba 
has entered into forty bilateral investment treaties  signaling a respect 
for the legitimacy of international investment law.37 
Public opinion in the U.S. and in Cuba generally supports a 
change to the U.S.-Cuba relationship.38  Many Americans, including 
many Cuban-Americans, are ready for a change in U.S.-Cuba 
relations.39  The younger Cuban-American demographic is especially 
                                                           
 
33  See Marc Frank, Cuban Leader Raul Castro Says He Will Resign in 
2018, REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2013, 7:45 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
cuba-castro/cuban-leader-raul-castro-says-he-will-retire-in-2018-
idUSBRE91N0HB20130225.  Nicole Acevedo & Carmen Sesin, Miguel Diaz-
, NBC NEWS (Apr. 
19, 2018, 9:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/miguel-d-az-
canel-becomes-cuba-s-president-ra-l-n867021. 
34  See COLLIN LAVERTY, CUBA S NEW RESOLVE ECONOMIC REFORM 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY IN THE 
AMERICAS (2011). 
35  See, e.g., Foreign Investment Act, 1995, No. 77, amended in 2014, 
No. 118 (Cuba).  
36  See, e.g., Law, 1993, No. 41 (Cuba) (allowing small private 
businesses to operate in certain occupations and giving approximately 170,000 
Cubans licenses to run private businesses).  In 1994, Cuba also legalized the 
use of U.S. dollars, eliminated government grants, and opened the agricultural 
sector to market forces.  
37  See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
38  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 109-23. 
39  See id. 
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enthusiastic for positive change and access to the island.40  However, 
even hopeful Cuban-Americans remain very concerned with the 
continuing human rights abuses in Cuba and Cuban policies that affect 
  
ability to visit the U.S..41 
On the other hand, many Republicans and Cuban-American 
hardliners in Congress, such as Marco Rubio, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and 
Ileana Ros-
U.S.-Cuba policy.42  -sided 
concessions lacking any credible commitment from Cuba for 
democratic change on the island.43 
Meanwhile, congressional Democrats tend to support lifting the 
embargo.44  In January 2016, House Democrats introduced a bill to lift 
the embargo that would repeal the Helms-Burton Act.45 
President Donald Trump  official Cuba policy aligns with those 
of the Republican hardliners, due to his strong relationship with the 
Cuban-American contingent on the Hill.46  After the election, Trump 
has demanded  Cuban concessions and described Fidel after his death 
                                                           
 
40  See Eric Hershberg & William M. LeoGrande, Conclusion: Keys to 
Assessing Progress Toward Establishing Normal Relations between the 
United States and Cuba, in A NEW CHAPTER IN US-CUBA RELATIONS 197 
(2016). 
41  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 118-23. 
42  See id. at 99. 
43  See, e.g., Sabrina Siddiqui, Marco Rubio: I Will Absolutely Roll 
Back Obama Cuba Policy, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 10, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/10/marco-rubio-cuba-
obama-policy-roll-back.  
44  See id. at 112. 
45  See Cuba Reconciliation Act, H.R. 574, 115th Cong. (2017). 
46  See Patricia Mazzei, Marco Rubio and his wife will dine with the 
Trumps at the White House, THE MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 14, 2017, 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/donald-
trump/article132778559.html. 
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47  The Helms-Burton Act, supported by the majority of 
Republicans and hardliners alike, requires resolution of the 
expropriated property claims as a prerequisite to lifting the embargo.48  
Thus, a shift toward resolution of these claims is in line with the 
-Burton Act requirements.49
If Trump follows through with hardline tactics that further isolate 
Cuba, he will garner support from the Cuban-American community 
and Republican members of Congress, but the tactics will likely roll-
back the progress in building trust with Cuba that has been gained 
under Obama and will undermine the U.S. interest in resolving its 
claims.50  In addition to the state of affairs in the U.S., recent events in 
Cuba51 52 
also serve to exacerbate the breaking down of the relationship between 
the U.S. and Cuba. 
                                                           
 
47  GLOBE STAFF
Oppressed His Own People, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 26, 2016, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2016/11/26/trump-says-castro-
was-brutal-dictator-who-oppressed-his-own-
people/t23gmg21BSqLqM8Bqs2CWP/story.html. 
48  See COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, Helms-Burton Act: 
Resurrecting the Iron Curtain (June 10, 2011), http://www.coha.org/helms-
burton-act-resurrecting-the-iron-curtain/; Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at 
§ 6067. 
49  See id. 
50  Cf. Marc Frank, 
and trade policy, REUTERS (Mar. 5, 2017, 10:48 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-usa-castro/cubas-raul-castro-blasts-
trumps-mexican-wall-and-trade-policy-idUSKBN16D0BM. 
51  See Patrick Oppmann & Laura Koranh, Senate Holds Hearings on 
, CNN (Jan. 9, 2018, 1:15 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/09/politics/senate-cuba-sonic-attacks-
hearing/index.html. 
52  See Sarah Marsh, Under Siege at Home, Maduro Gets Support from 
Regional Allies in Cuba, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:25 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-venezuela/under-siege-at-home-
maduro-gets-support-from-regional-allies-in-cuba-idUSKBN17D0AJ 
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On the other hand, a Republican-dominated Congress and the 
Trump administration could 
withholding outright endorsement of those advances to induce Cuba to 
promise of a one-party dominated Congress to amend or repeal 
economic and trade restrictions against Cuba can also be used to 
induce Cuba to compensate the U.S. for its expropriated property 
claims and other legal claims it may have against Cuba. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Historically, economically, socially, and legally, the time is ripe 
to resolve the outstanding expropriation claims.  The Trump 
administration should take steps to ensure that the change in 
administration is not a barrier to the settlement with Cuba of the 
outstanding 5,911 certified property claims.53  
proposing fresh ideas on ways to move forward that take into account 
U.S. interests in resolving its legal claims against Cuba and addressing 
human rights violations in Cuba.  With the right perspective, a 
Republican-dominated Congress could provide Trump with 
lessening the trade and economic sanctions to one that balances lifting 
the embargo with achieving the full array of its political and economic 
goals in Cuba, beginning with resolving U.S. expropriation claims 
against Cuba. 
y and its effect 
on U.S.-Cuba relations.  Even a short historical accounting of the 
relationship between the two nations reveals how fragile it is.  A 
history of mistrust and subversion creates a situation of 
hypersensitivity; where even minor miscommunications or shifts in 
policy can prove detrimental to diplomatic progress.  Building trust 
and respect between the Cuban and U.S. administrations is essential.  
                                                           
 
53  See Mark P. Sullivan, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 115th Congress, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 56 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44822.pdf. 
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interference in Cuban internal affairs in the future is harmful for 
building trust b human-
rights record, historical anti-American rhetoric and role as a rallying 
point against the U.S. is problematic for their future relationship.  
Therefore, continued and dedicated diplomacy should focus on 
relationship-building and trust-building methods to facilitate 
negotiations of any kind.54 
One such method involves choosing legitimate criteria or 
standards of fairness to govern the process of the negotiations that are 
independent of the will of either coun  but that account 
for their interests.55  If the U.S. and Cuba would agree that international 
law governs some of their outstanding legal claims against each other, 
then they can utilize international law as a fair framework to guide the 
negotiation process. 
II.  
DIPLOMACY ALONE IS UNLIKELY TO  
RESOLVE THE COMPLEX LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN 
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section will analyze the measures taken by Cuba to 
nationalize U.S. property and the measures taken by the U.S. to 
enforce the embargo against Cuba.  Both states have implemented 
legislation and taken other steps that further complicate their ability to 
fully restore diplomatic relations.  The U.S. legal claims against Cuba 
sing from the Cuban 
nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other 
                                                           
 
54  See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR MAKING, 
MANAGING AND MENDING DEALS AROUND THE WORLD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 53-57 (2003). 
55  See generally ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 81-94 (2d ed. 1991). 
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in Cuba from 1959-1967.56  These legal claims may include claims of 
current U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the time of the 
property to which they held title,57 and claims against the Cuban 
58  This 
section will go through these measures to argue that international law 
provides a fair framework to determine the validity of the U.S. claims 
and the appropriate compensation standard. 
and economic damages, 59 from the long-standing U.S. economic 
sanctions60 and personal injury damages sustained by Cubans killed or 
harmed by alleged U.S. hostilities.61  The economic damages sought 
                                                           
 
56  See 22 U.S.C. § 1643(b) (2012).  
57  See Helms Burton Act, supra note 22, at. § 6022(6) (2012). 
58  See CONSEJO DE ESTADO, Ley No. 989, printed in GACETA OFICIAL 
Oct. 16, 2012, no 44 (Cuba). 
59  
 
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/07/245094.htm. 
60  See REPUBLIC OF CUBA, On Resolution 69/5 of the United Nations 
and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against 
 36-37 (June 2015), 
http://www.cubavsbloqueo.cu/sites/default/files/INFORME%20BLOQUEO
%202015%20-%20EN.pdf.  Specifically, an estimated $121 billion in 
economic damages.  
61   
económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por los Estados Unidos de 
October 29, 2013, New York, New York, 
http://www.cubaminrex.cu/es/intervencion-del-ministro-de-relaciones-
exteriores-de-cuba-bruno-rodriguez-parrilla-en-el-68-
31, 1999, http://www.cuba.cu/ gobierno/DEMANDA.html; Richard E. 
Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba Transforming Trauma 
into Opportunity 1, 7 (Dec. 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
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by Cuba stem from the effects of the U.S. embargo on various Cuban 
industries.62  Further, the Cuban government claims that U.S. acts of 
terrorism against Cuba have caused 3,478 deaths and 2,099 disabling 
injuries.63  These acts include CIA-activities in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs 
invasion, the explosion of the French vessel La Coubre, the bombing 
of Cuban Airlines Flight 455 in 1976, aggressions from the U.S. naval 
base in Guantanamo, assassination of diplomat Félix García-
Rodriguez, and biological warfare.64  This section will examine those 
measures to show that customary international law also provides a fair 
  In response 
Cuba, the U.S. would likely raise claims against Cuba for similar 
actions taken by Cuba against the U.S.65   
These use-of-force claims are more politically sensitive and less 
likely to be successfully submitted for resolution under international 
law to a third-party neutral.  Moreover, the factual information 
required to analyze these claims under international law is not readily 
available and is likely classified.  Thus, this paper will not directly 
address these claims here.  However, by tackling the economic claims 
first, agreeing that they are governed by international law, and 
submitting them to a legal mechanism for resolution, the respective 
governments will be able to then focus on the more sensitive political 
matters through diplomatic channels. 
                                                           
 
content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-Cuba-
Feinberg.pdf. 
62  See Parrilla supra note 61, at 11-25, 36 (In the 2015 report to the 
United Nations General Assembly, Cuba asserted that the accumulated 
economic damages from the U.S. economic sanctions had reached $121 
billion.); Feinberg supra note 61, at 13. 
63  See REPUBLIC OF CUBA, Necesidad de poner fin al bloqueo 
económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por los Estados Unidos de 
America contra Cuba (July 2014); Feinberg supra note 61, at 13. 
64  See OLGA MIRANDA BRAVO, NACIONALIZACIONES Y BLOQUEO 
(1996); Feinberg supra note 61, at 14. 
65  See e.g., Alejandre supra note 4. 
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In light of the longstanding failure of diplomacy alone and the 
fragility of the relationship between the countries, agreeing that 
international law governs their compensation and damages claims will 
provide a certain legitimacy to the negotiation process.  In truth, this 
should not be too hard.  Both the U.S. and Cuba have through treaties,66 
domestic legislation,67 and their respective U.N. voting record68 
exhibited that international law should govern many of their legal 
claims against the other.  Submitting these claims to a third-party 
neutral mediator,69 arbitrator,70 or some other agreed-upon legal 
process71 (some of which will be explored in section IV) will help 
resolve these complex legal claims and allow the parties to focus 
political capital on more sensitive and pressing issues.  The next two 
sub-sections will explore how the complexity of the claims and the 
                                                           
 
66  See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Oct. 30, 
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947); General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade: Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33I.L.M. 1124 (Apr. 15,1994). 
67  See, e.g., Cuban Claims Act, 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (2017). 
68  See, e.g., Declaration on the Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV) (Oct. 21, 1954) [Declaration on Friendly Relation]. 
69  See Richard Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute 
Settlement, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISP. RESOL. 1, 25 
request or agree to limited intervention by a third party to help them break the 
impasse.  . . . [T]he mediator usually plays a more active part in facilitating 
communications and negotiations between the parties, and is sometimes 
permitted or expected to advance informal and nonbinding proposals of his or 
 
70  See id. 
series of disputes, by the agreement of the parties, to an ad hoc tribunal for 
 
71  See id. -finding, inquiry and 
conciliation. These are methods of settlement in which the parties request or 
agree to the intervention of a third party, usually on a more formal basis, for 
the purpose of determining particular facts or otherwise conducting an 
impartial examination of the dispute and, if the parties so agree, attempting to 
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hardened positions of each country as reflected in their national 
legislation significantly decreases the likelihood of settlement strictly 
through diplomatic channels. 
B. THE CUBAN EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. PROPERTY 
is used by many U.S. laws and 
regulations to describe the Cuban property takings.72  Cuba has 
insisted that the U.S. properties in Cuba were expropriated, not 
taking of property usually an industry or a sector of the economy to 
be owned by the state without any implication of compensation to 
the owner.73  
nationalization,  but without any suggestion of subsequent operation 
or ownership solely by the state.  Expropriation implies the designation 
of property for a public purpose unrelated to the owner of the property 
but subject to compensation to the owner.74  Under international law, 
the essential feature of expropriation is the taking of property by the 
                                                           
 
72  See, e.g., Helms Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6023(4).  
(A) the nationalization, expropriation, or other 
seizure by the Cuban Government of ownership or control of property, on or 
after January 1, 1959 (i) without the property having been returned or 
adequate and effective compensation provided; or (ii) without the claim to the 
property having been settled pursuant to an international claims settlement 
agreement or other mutually accepted settlement procedure; and  (B) the 
repudiation by the Cuban Government of, the default by the Cuban 
Government on, or the failure of the Cuban Government to pay, on or after 
January 1, 1959 (i) a debt of any enterprise which has been nationalized, 
expropriated, or otherwise taken by the Cuban Government; (ii) a debt which 
is a charge on property nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise taken by the 
Cuban Government; or (iii) a debt which was incurred by the Cuban 
 
73  See GORDON, supra note 8, at 119 n.24. 
74  See id. 
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state.75  For purposes of this paper the term expropriation will be used 
to describe the takings of U.S. property in Cuba. 
STAGE ONE: CUBAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS ON EXPROPRIATION 
Prior to 1959, the Cuban Constitution prohibited the confiscation 
of property.  To that effect, Article 24 of the 1940 Constitution stated: 
Confiscation of property is prohibited.  No person shall be 
deprived of their property except by a competent judicial 
authority and for a justified cause of public utility or social 
interest and always subject to a cash payment and 
indemnification, effectuated judicially.  The failure to meet these 
requirements will result in the right of the expropriated to be 
immune from the Justice Tribunals and the property be returned.  
In case of a challenge, the justice tribunal will determine the 
public utility or social interest and the need for expropriation to 
correspond.76
property a fundamental right under Articles 24 and 87, guaranteeing to 
all Cubans the right to own and use property freely.77  Article 24 
prohibited the government taking of property without a judicial 
determination of just cause and public purpose, and it further provided 
that any government taking of property must be accompanied by 
indemnification in cash.78  Article 87 recognized the Cuban right to 
private property to the fullest extent, limited only for public necessity 
                                                           
 
75  See OECD, 
in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, No. 2004/04 (Sept. 2004), available at 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_4.pdf. 
76  CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, art. 24, 1940. 
77  See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, art. 24, amended by 
Ley Fundamental de La Republica printed in GACETA OFICIAL 1959, no. 5-
123. 
78  See id. 
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or social interest as established by law.79 Robust amendment 
requirements also worked to strengthen the property protections.80
-enactment of the 1940 Constitution through 
the Fundamental Law of the Republic on February 7, 1959, contained 
nearly all of the original provisions and protections.81 The first 
amendment was the addition of Article 232.82 This amendment in 
effect gave the newly-designated Council of Ministers (Council) the 
right to amend the Constitution without deliberation in derogation of 
the more stringent requirements set forth in in the 1940 Constitution.83
As part of that first amendment, the Council changed the language of 
Article 24.84 Although not abolishing the right to property completely, 
confiscation of property.
Council that would form the basis for major expropriations and 
confiscations in that year.85 Eventually, the language of Article 24 was 
changed again in 1960 as follows:
No person shall be deprived of their property except by competent 
authority and for a cause of public utility or social or national 
interest.  The law shall regulate the procedure for expropriation 
and shall establish legislation and forms of payment and shall 
determine the competent authority to declare the case to be of 
79 See id. at art. 87.
80 See id. at art. 285-286.
81 See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, supra note 76, art. 
24.
82 See id. at art. 23.
83 See id.
84 Id. at art. 24. 
85 See, e.g., Ley 78, Feb. 13, 1959, Gaceta Oficial (Cuba); Ley 151, 
Mar. 17, 1959, Gaceta Oficial (Cuba).
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public utility or social or national interest and that expropriation 
is necessary.86 
Compensation for expropriated property was no longer a 
constitutional requirement. 
STAGE TWO: THE AGRARIAN REFORM ACT  
AND THE UNITED STATES  INITIAL RESPONSE 
The initial Cuban measure resulting in the expropriation of U.S.-
owned property was the Agrarian Reform Act of June 3, 1959.87  The 
essentially limiting holdings to small and medium-sized farms, [and] 
co- ment acreage 
for the interests of Cuban economic progress.88  The Act converted 
agricultural estates larger than five hectares into state-owned farms.  
The Act also provided that all stockholders of companies owning 
sugar-cane lands would have to be Cuban citizens.89  Although it 
orm Act entailed substantial 
taking of U.S. property, since a large percentage of the land 
90 
Article 29 of the Act recognized the constitutional right of land-
owners affected by this Law to receive an indemnity for the 
expropriated property.91  Accordingly, the Act provided a mechanism 
for compensation provided in the form of twenty-year government 
                                                           
 
86  Ley de Reforma Constitucional, art. 24, printed in GACETA OFICIAL 
July 5, 1960 (Cuba). 
87  Amir Rafat, Legal Aspects of the Cuban Expropriation of American-
Owned Property, 11 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45, 46 (1966). 
88  GORDON, supra note 8, at 75. 
89  Id. 
90  Rafat, supra note 87, at 46. 
91  See Ley de Reforma Agraria, at art. 29 printed in GACETA OFICIAL 
Jun. 3, 1959, No. 7 (Cuba). 
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bonds with 4.5% interest, payable in non-convertible exchange.92  The 
sm was to be implemented by Law 
numbers 576 and 588.93  Law 576 authorized the issuance of the 
twenty-year bond in the amount of 100 million pesos (approximately 
$1 million) to be issued in different denominations with interest 
payable semi-annually, and compensation of less than 100 pesos was 
to be paid in cash.94  Law 588 determined the valuation of the land for 
declared taxable value from October 1958, which could not be 
challenged in court.95 However, the compensation plan was dead on 
arrival and never implemented nor accepted by the U.S..96  Further, the 
Act was never carried out as enacted.97  Instead, the National Institute 
of Agrarian Reform (INRA) acted arbitrarily with broad powers by 
physically removing owners from the property without any receipt or 
                                                           
 
92  See id. at art. 31 (This compensation scheme was similar to the one 
that Mexico had offered the United States in 1938, after it expropriated 
American-owned oil refineries, which the United States found not to be 
compliant with international law. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.). 
93  Ley No. 576, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Sep. 25 1959 (Cuba); Ley 
No. 588, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Oct. 7, 1959 (Cuba). 
94  George Harper, Cuban and Peruvian Agrarian Reforms: At the 
Crossroads, 24 MIAMI. L. REV. 763, 768 (1970). 
95  Ley No. 588, supra note 93, at arts. 5 & 13. 
96  To generate the revenue necessary to pay for the property, Castro 
proposed that the United States increase its purchase of Cuban sugar from 3 
million tons of sugar per year to 8 million tons, something that was impossible 
to implement.  gar output was 5.9 million tons and it 
had never produced more than 7.2 million tons. See U.S. 
Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian Reform Law 958, 40 Bull. 1044 (1959) [ 
U.S. Dipl. Note on ARL]; See also John W. Smagula, Redirecting Focus: 
Justifying the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba and Resolving the Stalemate, 21 
N.C. J. INT L L. & COMP. REG
realistic or desirable to subsidize a Government engaging in extraordinary acts 
 
97  See GORDON, supra note 8, at 134. 
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acknowledgment.98  INRA made up the rules for expropriation as it 
went along.99 
The U.S. Department of State expressed its concerns over Cuban 
treatment of U.S. property in a diplomatic note on June 11, 1959.100  In 
international law a state has the 
political stability, and so 101  However, the U.S. 
the corresponding obligation to provide prompt, adequate, and 
102  As for the 
compensation provision in the Act, the Ambassador expressed concern 
103  Further, the Ambassador 
for expropriation.104  From the start, the U.S. framed the conflict as one 
governed by international law. 
The Cuban government responded by admitting it had an 
obligation under the 1940 Constitution to provide prompt and full 
into which the overthrown tyranny plunged the country and the marked 
105  The U.S. answered that the 
expropriating state cannot use domestic problems to excuse its 
                                                           
 
98  See id. at 135. 
99  See id. at 76. 
100  U.S. Dipl. Note on ARL, supra note 96, at 958-59 (emphasis added). 
101  Id. at 958. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. at 959. 
104  Id; see also CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA, supra note 
76. 
105  Rafat, supra note 87, at 58 (citing Cuban Note of June15, 1959, 
supplied by the U.S. Department of State, unpublished document on file with 
Western Reserve University Law Library). 
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es of international law relating to the 
106
pay compensation for the expropriations under the Agrarian Reform 
Laws, the U.S. framed the duty as governed by international law and 
Cuba framed it as governed by national law and subject to domestic 
compensation mirrored an on-going debate throughout the 1970s and 
1980s on the traditional and partial compensation principle under 
customary international law, which will be discussed further in the 
next section.
In response to multiple accusations from Cuba against the U.S. 
that its demands for payment were obstructive to its land reform 
the question of compensation in accordance with accepted principles 
107
STAGE THREE: COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF 
FOREIGN-PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN CUBA
The Cuban government passed the next and most significant law 
expropriating American property and assets Law 851 
(Nationalization Law) on July 6, 1960.108 The Nationalization Law 
authorized the Cuban government to forcefully expropriate all 
American property interests in defense of Cuban national interest.109
106 Id. at 58-59 (citing to U.S. Note of Oct. 12, 1959, supplied by the 
University Law Library).
107 See U.N. Doc. A/4537 at 13 (Oct. 13, 1960).
108 See Ley 851, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Jul. 13, 1960 (Cuba). 
109 See id. at Preamble.
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U.S. political aggression, obligating the Cuban government to adopt 
such a sweeping expropriation measure.110 
Nationalization Law compensation arrangement also relied on 
ramping up the sugar quota, but would also be impossible since the 
U.S. had already cut the sugar quota.111 
Foreign Relations in which Ambassador Bonsal wrote: 
The Nationalization Law is both arbitrary and confiscatory  in 
that its provisions for compensation for property seized fail to 
meet the most minimum criteria necessary to assure the payment 
of prompt, adequate and effective compensation and in its specific 
prohibition of any form of judicial or administrative appeal from 
the resolutions of the expropriating authorities.112 
In furtherance of the mandates of the Nationalization Law, 
Resolution numbers 1, 2, and 3 transferred all American-owned 
enterprises into state ownership.113  These resolutions provided for the 
nationalization of the Cuban Telephone Company, the Cuban Electric 
Company, the Sinclair Oil companies, the thirty five remaining sugar 
mills, several other companies, and three U.S. banks.114  The 
resolutions also authorized the expropriation of the remaining 166 U.S. 
companies operating in Cuba.115 
                                                           
 
110  See id. 
111  Proclamation No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1960). 
112   U.S. Protests New Cuban Law Directed at 
American Property 171, 43 Bull. 1101 (Aug. 1, 1960) (emphasis added). 
113  See Rafat, supra note 87, at 47. 
114  See Resolución No. 1, Aug. 6, 1960, art. XXIII, Leyes del Gobierno 
Provisional de la Revolución 181 (Cuba).  See GORDON, supra note 8, at 101, 
102; See also Resolución No. 2, Sep. 17, 1960 art. XXIV, Leyes del Gobierno 
Provisional de la Revolución 127 (Cuba). 
115  See Resolución No. 3, Oct. 24, 1960, art. XXV, Leyes del Gobierno 
Provisional de la Revolución 181 (Cuba). See GORDON, supra note 8, at 104. 
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Before Resolution No. 3, on October 13, 1960, the Cuban 
government passed Law Nos. 890116 and 891.117 Law Nos. 890 and 
that of a planned economy118 and nationalize 382 major companies and 
banks.119 These laws were part of a larger policy aimed at the complete 
elimination of foreign-owned private investment in all but minor 
businesses.120 Many Cuban businesses were also expropriated at that 
time.121
Finally, Cuba passed Law No. 989 of 1961, which authorized the 
122 This law was implemented by 
Resolution 454, which provided that Cubans leaving the country for 
the U.S. had twenty-nine days to return to Cuba, those traveling 
elsewhere had sixty days, and those traveling to Europe had ninety 
days.123 Failure to return to Cuba within those time periods was 
deemed a permanent departure from the country, rendering the 
124 This law remains in effect 
today. 
CONCLUSION
failing to provide U.S. companies and citizens
116 See Ley 890, printed in GACETA OFICIAL 13 Oct. 13, 1960 (Cuba).
117 See Ley 891, printed in GACETA OFICIAL 13 Oct. 13, 1960 (Cuba).
118 See Rafat, supra note 87, at 48.
119 See GORDON, supra note 8, at 103.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 104.
122 See Ley No. 989, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Dec. 6, 1961 (Cuba).
123 See Resolución No. 454, printed in GACETA OFICIAL Oct. 9, 1961 
(Cuba) (In reality, those wishing to leave Cuba after 1961 were required to 
turn their assets over to the state before being granted final authorization to 
depart; their personal property upon departing was also arbitrarily taken by 
bject to this process in 1970 and 
1980.).
124 See id.
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from 1959-1963.125  The U.S. claim is two-fold.  First, the alleged 
settlement offers made by Cuba and the compensation schemes 
provided in each expropriation measure were illusory.  Second, even 
if they were not illusory, the expropriation measures and settlement 
offers failed to provide for full compensation as required by 
international law. 
it was obligated to provide compensation, and its offers to do so were 
rejected by the U.S. at its own peril.  Additionally, even if the U.S. 
standard of compensation was applicable, the economic situation in 
compensation at the time of the takings.126  Thus, the countries differ 
on whether international law or national law applies to expropriation 
of foreign nationals and what standard of compensation is appropriate. 
One complicating factor worth mentioning is the mass exodus of 
Cuban-Americans whose property and assets were confiscated as 
punishment for leaving the island who have claims against the Cuban 
government.  As noted in section I, this group is a formidable voting 
bloc for Republicans and has a strong lobby in Washington, DC.  Many 
personal and real property and have raised claims against the Cuban 
government arising from human rights violations.  Their claims, 
however, are not recognized by international law, since international 
investment law and related international claims arise from notions of 
diplomatic protection of aliens, not nationals, at the time of the 
expropriation.127  Yet, any deal with Cuba or normalization of relations 
with Cuba will need to address these claims.  Therefore, in sections 
IV, V, and VI, this paper explores different ways in which these claims 
                                                           
 
125  See, e.g., U.S. Dipl. Note ARL, supra note 96, at 959. 
126  See, e.g., id. at 959. 
127  David Collins, An Introduction to International Investment Law 11 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2017); see De Sanchez v. Banco Central de 
Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir., 1985). 
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can be included as part of a larger bargain with Cuba along with the 
advantages and disadvantages of doing so.
C. THE UNITED STATES EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA
The U.S. embargo against Cuba also went through several stages.  
At first, the U.S. embargo was characterized as a countermeasure to 
U.S. property.  It was aimed at the 
enforcement of international law standards of compensation against 
Cuba.128 Then, the embargo was strengthened in response to national 
security concerns culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis.129
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. embargo was intended to 
and political rights.130 By the end of the 1990s, it served to deter 
foreign aid to Cuba and foreign investment in Cuba that would 
undermine the value of the U.S. expropriated property claims against 
Cuba.131
STAGE ONE: THE EMBARGO AS A COUNTERMEASURE AGAINST CUBA S
MASS UNCOMPENSATED TAKINGS OF U.S. PROPERTY
On October 13, 1960, President Eisenhower, under the authority 
of the Export Control Act,132 announced a complete ban on U.S. 
exports to Cuba except for non-subsidized foodstuffs, medicines, and 
medical supplies.133 The Export Act expressly authorized the 
the foreign policy of the U.S. and to aid in fulfilling its international 
128 See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (2012).
129 See, e.g., Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 1959-63 (1962).
130 See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6010 (2017).
131 See, e.g., Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22; 28 U.S.C. § 1611 
(2012).
132 50 U.S.C. §§ 2021-32 (repealed in 1969).
133 See U.S. of State, United States Institutes Controls on Exports 
to Cuba, 958, 43 Bull. 715 (Oct. 19, 1960) [Eisenhower Statement on 
Embargo].
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obligations 134 Accordingly, President Eisenhower stated the U.S. 
of the [United States] against discriminatory, aggressive, and injurious 
135 In 1961, before the Bay 
of Pigs invasion but after the official break of diplomatic relations, 
Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act.136 The FAA required that 
the Cuban government compensate the U.S. for the taking of property 
in accordance with international law before it could provide Cuba with 
financial assistance and lift the embargo: 
Except as may be deemed necessary by the President. . . no 
assistance shall be furnished . . . to any government of Cuba, nor 
shall Cuba be entitled to receive any quota . . . or to receive any 
other benefits . . . until the President determines that such 
government . . . according to international law return to the 
United States citizens . . . or to provide equitable compensation 
for, property taken from such citizens and entities on or after 
January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba.137
As evidenced by the language of the FAA and the 1959 U.S. 
diplomatic note in response to the Agrarian Reform Act, the U.S. 
framed the embargo 
violation of international law.138
STAGE TWO: STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO IS JUSTIFIED BY THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT OF THE CUBA-SOVIET ALLIANCE
President Kennedy strengthened the embargo in response to the 
growing Soviet military presence in Cuba.139 On February 6, 1962, 
134 S. 63, 81st Cong. § 2(b) (1949) (emphasis added).
135 Smagula, supra note 96, at 75.
136 See Foreign Assistance Act, supra note 128, at § 2370.
137 Id. at § 2370(a)(2) (emphasis added).
138 See U.S. DEP T OF STATE, U.S. Informs Cuba of Views on Agrarian 
Reform Law, 40 Bull. 958 (1959); see also Foreign Assistance Act, supra note 
128at § 2151 (2000).
139 See Proclamation No. 3447, supra note 129.
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the President announced a trade embargo that prevented the imports 
into the U.S. of any goods of Cuban origin, except as permitted by the 
U.S. Department of Treasury.140  on 
cited the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,141 to urge 
member states of the Organization of American States (OAS)
those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and 
self- is incompatible with 
the principles and objectives of the Inter-
- 142  The 
President also confirmed that the Cuban trade restrictions were 
143 
In 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Treasury Department 
issued the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR)144 under the 
authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA). 145  
TWEA was amended in 1933 to cover peacetime national 
emergencies146 
comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries as one means of 
dealing with both peacetime emergenc 147  The 
[Cuba], or any national thereof, has . . .  any interest of any nature 
                                                           
 
140  See id.  
141  Inter-American Treaty Of Reciprocal Assistance, Organization of 
American States (1947). 
142  Proclamation No. 3447, supra note 129. 
143  Id. 
144  31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101-.901 (2017). 
145  See 50 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4341 (2017). 
146  See 12 U.S.C. § 95 (2012). 
147  Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). 
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149
STAGE THREE: STRENGTHENING THE EMBARGO 
AIMS TO INDUCE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN CUBA 
AND TOPPLE THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT
U.S. legislation passed in the 1990s significantly expanded the 
breadth of the embargo against Cuba and demanded democratic and 
capitalist change in Cuba to lift the embargo.150 For example, the 
president was authorized to allow the export of food, medicine, and 
other humanitarian assistance to Cuba only if he determined that Cuba 
was undergoing a democratic transition as defined by the Cuban 
Democracy Act (CDA).151 To lift the embargo as codified in the CDA, 
the president had to report to Congress that Cuba made a commitment 
to hold fair and transparent elections conducted under internationally 
recognized observers and that it was respecting civil and political 
rights.152
In support of the CDA, Congress made the following findings:
The government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated consistent 
disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights 
and for democrati
exercise of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and other rights 
recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
December 10, 1948.  It has refused to admit into Cuba the 
148 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201(a) (2018).
149 Id. at (b)(1).
150 See Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 130; Helms-Burton Act, 
supra note 22.
151 See Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 130, at § 6006.
152 See id. at § 6007.
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representative of the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
appointed to investigate human rights violations on the island.153
application of sanctions directed at the Castro government and support 
154
155
Four years later, Congress passed the Helms-Burton Act, which 
codified the embargo with the express aim of destabilizing the Cuban 
government.156 The Helms-Burton Act went significantly further than 
negotiate compensation for nationalized property, and normalize 
relations with Cuba.157 This Act remains in effect today.158
Title I of the Act prohibits the indirect financing of Cuban 
interests,159
institutions,160 and reduces financial support to countries and 
institutions that provide loans or other assistance to Cuba.161 Title I 
also conditioned the reinstitution of family remittances and travel to 
internal economy.162
Title II purports to induce democratic change in Cuba through 
certain stringent ultimatums.163 Title II sets forth guidelines for U.S. 
assistance that is limited to a free and independent Cuba and permits 
153 Id. at § 6001(1).
154 Id. at § 6002(1).
155 Id. at § 6002(5).
156 See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22.
157 See id. at §§ 6031-46.
158 See id. 
159 See id. at § 6033(a). 
160 See id. at § 6034(a).
161 See id. at § 6034(b).
162 See id. at § 6042.
163 See id. at §§ 6061-67.
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164  Further, 
Title II authorizes lifting the embargo only when the president 
determines that the Cuban government is democratically elected 
according to a long and specific list of requirements.165   
approach to the to the expropriated-property issue requires a new 
Cuban government to commit to returning all expropriated property to 
the U.S. or to provided full compensation for the properties in order to 
be recognized by the U.S. as a democratically elected government 
eligible for lifting the embargo.166 
and 
deter foreign investment in Cuba.167  Under section 6082, any person 
who traffics in confiscated property which once belonged to a U.S. 
national is liable to that U.S. national for damages in U.S. federal 
courts.168  
and intentionally . . . engages in commercial activity using or otherwise 
benefitting from confis 169  Although this Title has been 
suspended by each consecutive U.S. president,170 its potential 
consequences are vast.   
Notably, the right to sue for damages is extended to individuals 
who were not U.S. nationals at the time of the confiscation but who 
subsequently became U.S. nationals.171  This means that all Cuban 
nationals that fled Cuba since the Revolution, became U.S. citizens, 
                                                           
 
164  See id. at § 6062(a). 
165  See id. at § 6064-65 (1996). 
166  See id. at § 6065. 
167  See id. at § 6022. 
168  See 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2012). 
169  Id. § 6023(13)(A)(ii). 
170  See U.S.-CUBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC., Update On Title 
Three Suspension Of Libertad Act (Helms-Burton), (February 06, 2017), 
http://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/2/6/update-on-title-three-suspension-of-
libertad-act-helms-burton. 
171  See Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6023(15). 
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and can prove ownership of expropriated property or assets in Cuba, 
can sue an alleged trafficker for damages.  As of 2004, there were over 
1.4 million Cuban U.S. citizens living in the U.S. who may be eligible 
under Helms-Burton Act to sue a foreign investor for trafficking in 
previously owned Cuban property.172
In support of the Helms-Burton Act, Congress made twenty-eight 
findings,173 
international obligations.174  One of the findings is that the U.S. has a 
fundamental freedoms as expressed in the Charter of the United 
175  The 
confiscations of or taking of property belonging to United States 
nationals [and] exploitation of this property [undermining] comity of 
176 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions177 
178 
citing to the following: 
Article 39 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter which, 
                                                           
172  See Maria Werlau, International Law and Other Considerations on 
the Repatriation of Cuban Balseros by the United States, ASS N FOR THE 
STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECON. (November 30, 2004), 
https://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/international-law-and-other-
considerations-on-the-repatriation-of-cuban-balseros-by-the-united-states/. 
173  See Helms-Burton Act supra note 22, at § 6021(1)-(28). 
174  See id. 
175  Id. at § 6021(9). 
176  Id. at § 6081(2) 
177  See id The United Nations General Assembly 
passed Resolution 47-139 on December 18, 1992, Resolution 48-142 on 
December 20, 1993, and Resolution 49-  
178  Id. 
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determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken . . ., to maintain or restore 
determined that massive and systematic violations of human 
imposed sanctions due to such violations of human rights in the 
cases of Rhodesia, South Africa, Iraq, and the former 
Yugoslavia.179 
After comparing Cuba to Haiti,180 the Act points out that: 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, 
democratically elected government of Haiti was restored to power 
on October 15, 1994.  The Cuban people deserve to be assisted in 
a decisive manner to end the tyranny that has oppressed them for 
36 years, and the continued failure to do so constitutes ethically 
improper conduct by the international community.  For the past 
36 years, the Cuban Government has posed and continues to pose 
a national security threat to the United States.181 
The U.S. Congress has continued to frame the embargo and its 
conduct in the face of accepted international legal standards.182 
The Helms-Burton Act resulted in a serious limitation on U.S. 
presidential and executive power to conduct foreign affairs with 
Cuba.183  
and received the Title III waiver, which Clinton immediately put to 
                                                           
 
179  Id. at § 6021(23)-(24). 
180  See id. at § 6021(25). 
181  Id. at § 6021(26)-(28). 
182  See id. at § 6021. 
183  See CUBA STUDY GROUP, supra note 26, at 1. 
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use.184  President George W. Bush and President Obama would 
eventually follow suit and continue to implement the waiver.185  In 
bypass elements of the Act, Congress passed the Trade Sanctions 
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000186 (TSRA), which 
allowed U.S. entities to sell agricultural products directly to the Cuban 
government but banned all travel to Cuba beyond previously 
prescribed categories of travel.187 
At the direction of President Bush, the Treasury Department 
amended the 1963 CACR to expand general license visits to close 
relatives in Cuba, increase carry-on remittances for travelers to Cuba, 
and facilitate humanitarian transactions with groups in Cuba dedicated 
188  The humanitarian 
assistance provision was criticized as illusory since it was clear that 
the Cuban government would not permit assistance to aid its 
opposition.189 
In 2003, President Bush laid out plans for creating a Commission 
for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC).190  The CAFC
                                                           
 
184  See Rossella Brevetti & Peter Menyasz, Clinton Delays Lawsuits 
Under Title III of Helms-Burton, 13 INT L. TRADE REP. 1158 (Jul. 17, 1996); 
Clinton Extends Title III of Helms-Burton Act NAT L. J. CONGRESS DAILY 
(Jan. 16, 1998). 
185  See U.S.-CUBA TRADE AND ECON. COUNCIL, INC., supra note 170. 
186  See Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000). 
187  See 22 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (2012); see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(1-
12) (2007) (explaining what the travel categories are). 
188  31 C.F.R. § 515 (2007). 
189  See John-Thor Dahlburg, Bush Brothers Keenly Attentive to Cuban 
Americans, L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
2002/may/22/nation/na-flagop22. 
190  See 
Report to the President (2004) [ CAFC I]; see also Remarks by the President 
on Cuba, The WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES, (October 10, 2003), 
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like the Helms-Burton Act, aimed at ousting Fidel Castro and his 
-Castro Cuba.191   To oust 
groups in Cuba,192 deploying communications aircraft to increase 
range of TV and radio transmissions to Cuba,193 limiting family 
visits,194 reducing remittances,195 and limiting financial aid.196  The 
-Castro Cuba would then include providing 
humanitarian aid,197 changing the education system to incorporate 
non-communist curriculums,198 promoting the rule of law,199 and 
converting Cuba to a free-market economy.200 Importantly, these 
reforms would include the settlement of all compensation claims based 
on land expropriations.201  In 2006, CACF issued a second report 
which called for the release of political prisoners in Cuba, the 
disruption of the Cuban flow of currency, and the initiation of vast 
domestic legal reforms.202 
                                                           
 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/10/ 
20031010-2.html. 
191  See generally CAFC I, supra note 190 
interactions with Cuba post-Castro regime). 
192  See id. at 15-25. 
193  See id. at 27-28. 
194  See 31 C.F.R. § 515.561(a) (2007) (implementing recommendations 
of CAFC I); see also CAFC I, supra note 190, at 41. 
195  See 31 C.F.R. § 515.570(a) (2007) (implementing recommendations 
of CAFC I); see also CAFC I, supra note 190, at 39-40. 
196  See CAFC I, supra note 190, at 44-50. 
197  See id. at 59-67. 
198  See id. 97-98, 102-03. 
199  See id. at 161-71, 175-81, 190-92, 196-98. 
200  See id. at 214-17, 229-34, 273-315, 317, 345. 
201  See id. at 224. 
202  See 
Report to the President, 32-33, 53-55 (2006), available at 
http://www.cafc.gov/documents/organization/68166.pdf [CAFC II]. 
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By the end of the Bush administration, it seemed that the embargo 
was even more severe than it had been even in the 1960s when Soviet 
missiles on Cuban soil were aimed at the U.S. 
STAGE FOUR: MOVEMENT TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS  
WITH CUBA AND LOOSENING THE EMBARGO 
As noted previously, Obama eased travel restrictions and enabled 
remittances to Cuba and people-to-people exchanges.203  In December 
2014, Obama announced the U.S. would restore diplomatic relations 
with Cuba by reopening the U.S. embassy and removing Cuba from 
the list of state sponsors of terrorism.204  In May 2015, Cuba was 
removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism205  and the U.S. 
embassy in Cuba was re-opened in August 2015.206  Yet none of these 
liberalizations overcome the most significant barrier to opening 
economic relations: The Helms-Burton Act.
Most recently, President Trump has expanded certain restrictions 
on financial transactions with Cuban officials and on travel to Cuba.207  
But, there have not been many substantive changes to the current 
regulations in place.208  
                                                           
 
203  DOMINGUEZ & PROVOST, supra note 5, at 129-50. (President Clinton 
made some changes before the enactment of the Helms-Burton Act, and 
President Bush kept some of those changes, but reversed some as well.).   
204  See ROSEN & KASSAB, supra note 15, at 72. 
205  Id. at 73. 
206  Id. at 74. 
207  U.S. DEP T OF TREASURY, Treasury, Commerce, and State 
Implement Changes to the Cuba Sanctions Rules, (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/sm0209.aspx 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2018). 
208  Id.  
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D. U.S. EVALUATION OF ITS PROPERTY CLAIMS 
In 1964, Congress added Title V the Cuban Claims Act209 to the 
International Claims Settlement Act210 to specifically address U.S. 
211  After World War II, Congress 
enacted the International Claims Settlement Act to establish the 
212  The Commission was established to administer and 
disburse funds to U.S. citizens who lost their property in specified 
foreign countries.213  The Cuban Claims Act established a procedural 
mechanism for adjudicating and quantifying claims, but did not 
authorize the appropriation of any funds for claim payments.214 
In general, under the International Claims Settlement Act, 
Congress directed the Commission to 
215  To determine the value of 
the claim, 
under international law, the Commission shall award the fair 
market value of the property as of the time of the taking by the 
foreign government involved (without regard to any action or 
event that occurs after the taking), except that the value of the 
claim shall not reflect any diminution in value attributable to 
actions which are carried out, or threats of action which are made, 
by the foreign government with respect to the property before the 
taking. Fair market value shall be ascertained in accordance with 
the method most appropriate to the property taken and equitable 
to the claimant, including (i) market value of outstanding equity 
                                                           
 
209  Cuban Claims Act, supra note 67.  (In 1966, Chapter V was also 
amended to extend the applicability of its provisions to Communist China.). 
210  22 U.S.C. § 1621 (1955). 
211  Cuban Claims Act, supra note 67.  
212  Id.  
213  22 U.S.C. § 1621-1627 (1964).  
214  Cuban Claims Act, supra note 67. 
215  22 U.S.C. § 1623(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
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securities; (ii) replacement value; (iii) going-concern value 
(which includes consideration of an enterprise's profitability); and 
(iv) book value.216   
The Commission is independent in its findings, and its awards are 
ation.217  As 
to the property claims against the Cuban government, the Commission 
was directed to:  
determine in accordance with applicable substantive law, 
including international law, the amount and validity of claims by 
nationals of the United States against the Government of 
the nationalization, expropriation, intervention, or other taking of, 
or special measures directed against, property including any 
rights or interests therein owned wholly or partially, directly or 
indirectly at the time by nationals of the United States. . . In 
making the determination with respect to the validity and amount 
of claims and value of properties, rights, or interests taken, the 
Commission shall take into account the basis of valuation most 
appropriate to the property and equitable to the claimant, 
including but not limited to: (i) fair market value, (ii) book value, 
(iii) going concern value, or (iv) cost of replacement.218 
As to personal injury or disability claims against the Cuban 
government, the Commission was directed to: 
determine in accordance with applicable substantive law, 
including international law, the amount and validity of claims by 
nationals of the United States against the Government of Cuba. . 
. arising since January 1, 1959. . . for disability or death resulting 
                                                           
 
216  Id. (emphasis added).  
217  22 U.S.C. § 1622g (2012).  
218  22 U.S.C. § 1643b(a) (emphasis added). 
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from actions taken by or under the authority of the Government 
of Cuba.219 
In addition, the Act provides that the Commission must determine 
220 to the expropriated property and any offsets to 
the award.221  It is important to note that the Commission was only 
authorized to consider claims of U.S. nationals who had title to the 
expropriated property at the time of the taking and held it continuously 
until filing their claim with the Commission.222  The Commission did 
not have jurisdiction to review any claims to expropriated property for 
property owners who were Cuban nationals at the time of the taking.223 
The Commission was set up to apply standards of international 
law and determine the validity of the expropriation claims and the 
value of the compensation due.224  The Final Report of the 
225 in referring to the language 
from the international legal standard that would normally prevail in the 
evaluation of nationalized property.  It is designated to strengthen that 
standard by giving specific bases of valuation that the Commission 
226 
                                                           
 
219  Id. § 1643b(b) (emphasis added). 
220  Id. 
wholly or partially, directly or indirectly by a national of the United States on 
 
221  Id. § 1643e.  
222  Id. § 1643c.  
223  Id.; see 
or (B) a corporation or other legal entity which is organized under the laws of 
 
224  22 U.S.C. § 1623 (2012). 
225  See FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1. 
226  Id. at 137, 142 (stating the specific bases of determining valuation 
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The Commission adjudicated a total of 8,816 claims, of which, 
5,911 were found to be compensable.227  The total principal value of 
adjudicated claims was $1,851,057,358.00.228  Thereafter, on July 15, 
2005,229 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice requested the 
Commission conduct a Second Cuban Claims Program to adjudicate 
and certify claims that arose after May 1, 1967, which were not 
adjudicated by the original Cuban Claims Program.230  The 
Commission received a total of five claims and denied three.231  Two 
claims were certified as valid in principal amounts of $51,128,926.95 
and $16,000.00.232 
E. CONCLUSION  
Throughout the years, the U.S. has adamantly defended the long-
of international law, including the uncompensated takings of $1.9 
billion in American property from 1950-1963, threat of use of force, 
and human rights violations.  All of these grounds invoke international 
law principles. 
The Helms-
ments in Cuba has rallied international 
law.233  The next section discusses whether the U.S. embargo against 
Cuba violates or is justified by international law.  
                                                           
 
227  See FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1.  
228  Id.  
229  Letter from Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, to Mr. Tamargo, 
(July 15, 2005). 
230  Id. 
231  FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1.  
232  Id. 
233  See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 64th plen. Mtg. at 19-20, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/PV.64 (Nov. 27, 2001) (recording the 2001 vote as 167-3-3 in favor 
of drafting a resolution for ending the embargo).  
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III.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW PROVIDES A FAIR 
FRAMEWORK TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL CLAIMS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The economic claims between the U.S. and Cuba are best 
addressed and resolved through established sources of international 
law.  The sources of international law include international 
234  The primary sources of international law 
are international agreements and customary international law.235  An 
the agreement.236  
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary 
law or international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary 
237 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
238  This sense of legal obligation is generally referred to 
as opinio juris.239  Over time, international agreements evidencing a 
                                                           
234  Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060 33 U.N.T.S. art. 38 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  See also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 101, 102(1)(a)-(c) 
 . . .consists of rules and principles of general 
application dealing with the conduct of states and of international 
organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their 
  
235  ICJ Statute, supra note 234, at art. 38. 
236   Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 102 cmt. f; See also COLLINS, 
supra note 127, at 28. 
237  Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 102(4). 
238  Id. at § 102(2). 
239  Id. at § 102 cmt. c.  
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widespread pattern of behavior by countries based on the belief the 
provisions involved are obligatory may become customary 
international law.240  Thus, some multilateral agreements can create 
- 241  This 
states generally, is widely accepted, and is not rejected by a significant 
242  S
bilateral arrangements on a subject may constitute practice and also 
243  Customary international law also arises 
from tribunal decisions, since they are applying requirements of 
international law.244  Under international law: 
If a state by its act or omission breaches an international 
 If the 
consequence of the breach is an injury to another state, the 
delinquent state is responsible to make reparation for the breach 
to the injured state. Thus, when an internationally wrongful act 
occurs, it creates new legal relations between the states 
concerned. A state injured by a violation may seek redress by 
claims made through diplomatic channels or through a procedure 
of dispute settlement to which the states concerned have agreed. 
Under some circumstances, the injured state may take measures 
of self-help or countermeasures not involving the use of force.245 
International law provides a useful framework to resolve the U.S. 
claims against Cuba for uncompensated expropriation of American 
                                                           
 
240  Id. at § 102 cmt. j.  See also COLLINS, supra note 127, at 28. 
241  Id. at § 102 cmt. i.  
242  Id. 
243  Id. 
244  Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? 
Modern Tribunals and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT L 
L. 474, 495 (1991). 
245  LORI FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, International Law: 
Cases & Materials, 485 (West, 6th ed. 2014).  
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property.246  ty 
247  
responsible under international law for injury resulting: from a taking 
by the state of property of a national of another state that is not for a 
public purpose, or is discriminatory, or is not accompanied by 
248  International law defines just 
sence of exceptional circumstances. . . 
an amount equivalent to the value of the property taken and be paid at 
the time of the taking, or within a reasonable time thereafter with 
interest from the date of the taking, and in form economically usable 
by the 249  
250 
against the U.S. that the embargo is an illegal act of economic 
coercion.251  The U.S. and Cuba are both signatories to or have ratified 
international instruments that uphold the international norms on the 
prohibition of use of force,252  the prohibition on intervention into 
                                                           
246  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 
section sets forth the responsibility of a state under customary international 
law for certain economic injury to foreign nationals. . . .A state is responsible 
under this section for injury to property and other economic interests of private 
 
247  Id.  
248  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712(1). 
249  Id. 
250  See id. at § 712 cmt. d.  
251  See, e.g., Explanatory Memorandum from Ricardo ALARCON de 
QUESADA, Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, at 2, U.N. 
Doc. A/46/193 (Aug. 19, 1991). 
252  U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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domestic affairs of another state,253 as well as on the promotion of 
development254 and self-determination.255  Whether or not economic 
coercion is prohibited under the international legal principle of non-
intervention can be determined by evaluating the Organization of 
American States (OAS) Charter,256
Declaration on Friendly Relations,257 and other related U.N. General 
Assembly resolutions.258 
 Customary international law provides that each state is 
responsible to other states for breach of its duties under international 
law or agreement and must pay compensation for any damages arising 
therefrom.259  
                                                           
 
253  See, e.g., id. at para. 7; Organization of American States, Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, O.A.S.T.S. No. 37, art. 8. 
[OAS Charter]. 
254  See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 55-56; G.A. Res. 217A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 12, 1948); G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration 
on the Right to Development (Dec. 4, 1986) [Declaration on Development]. 
255  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200[B] (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. No. 
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [ICCPR], art.1 (however, Cuba is not a 
party); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200[A] (XXI), at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th plen. mtg., Supp. 
No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [ICESCR], , art.1 (however, the 
U.S. is not a party). Even though the U.S. and Cuba are not concurrent parties 
to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, it shows that they both generally find 
international law as legitimate as they have entered into their respective 
international agreements.   
256  OAS Charter, supra note 253, at art. 19. 
257  See Declaration on Friendly Relations supra note 68. 
258   D G. A. Res. 2131 (XX) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their 
Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 32 (1974). 
259  Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgement, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9) 
of human life which resulted from them, and that there is a duty. . . to pay 
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failure to apply a convention, and there is no necessity for this to be 
260 
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED STATES   
LEGAL CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA 
resulting from: a taking by the state of the property of a national of 
another state that is not for a public purpose, or is discriminatory, or is 
not accompanied by p 261  The U.S. has 
were arbitrary and discriminatory.262  An unreasonable distinction in 
the expropriation measure suggests the measure is arbitrary and 
discriminatory.263 The public purpose requirement, although repeated 
throughout all formulations of international law on expropriation of 
alien property, is difficult to apply due to its overbreadth.264 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,265 though later overturned, 
reflects an instance in which the U.S. argues nationalism is 
discriminatory.  
authorizing the nationalization of all U.S. property violated 
international law, a U.S. District Court held in part that: 
[T]he present nationalization measure is contrary to the standards 
of international law because of its discriminatory nature. The act 
                                                           
 
 victim state.).  See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, 
at § 206 cmt. e. 
260  See, e.g., The Factory at Chorzow (Ger. V. Pol.), Judgment 1928 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 13 (Sept. 13) [hereinafter Chorzow].  
261  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712(1). 
262  U.S. DEP T OF STATE supra note 112 
discriminatory in that it is specifically limited in its application to the seizure 
 
263  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 cmt. f. 
264  Id. at § 712 cmt. e. 
265  Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp 375 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960), , 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), , 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
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classifies United States nationals separately from all other 
nationals and provides no reasonable basis for such classification. 
The decree does not justify the classification on the basis of 
conduct of the owners in managing and exploiting their properties 
or on the basis of the importance to the security of the state where 
ownership of the property resides. The justification is simply 
reprisal against another Government.266 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court 
decision adding: 
[T]he United States did not breach a rule of international law in 
deciding, for whatever reason she deemed sufficient, the sources 
from which she would buy sugar. We cannot find any established 
principles of international jurisprudence that requires a nation to 
continue buying commodities from an unfriendly source. 
Accordingly it follows that the amendment to the Sugar Act of 
1948 did n
law.267 
No. 851 likely violated international law because it was discriminatory 
and not ta.268  The 
U.S. 
validity under international law of a foreign expropriation is beyond 
269 However, these lower court decisions 
 only cases in which U.S. 
courts passed on legal questions raised by expropriation of alien 
270  On the other hand, scholars have argued that the 
subsequent Cuban expropriation measures no longer targeting 
                                                           
 
266  Id. at 385. 
267  Banco Nacional de Cuba, 307 F.2d 845, 866 (2d Cir. 1962). 
268  Id. 
269  Rafat, supra note 87, at 50. 
270  Id.  
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American properties and expropriating all foreign-owned property 
271 
It is debatable whether the claims have been undermined, but it is 
undisputed that the Cuban expropriations of U.S. property were never 
compensated.   Thus, the U.S. and Cuba will eventually have to agree 
on the appropriate standard of compensation that is due.  The 
International Settlement Act, the Cuban Claims Act, and the Helms-
Burton Act express that full compensation is the applicable 
international compensation standard used by the U.S.272 
The traditional international law principles on just compensation 
for expropriation of alien property date back to European traditions 
from the mid-nineteenth century to Word War I, when a majority of 
states had constitutions and treaties that permitted direct expropriation 
only with compensation.273  In 1928, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice confirmed that just compensation for 
expropriation was a customary international law principle in The 
Factory at Chorzow case.274 Chorzow invo
expropriation of German-owned industrial property.275  The Court held 
that immunity from confiscation is a principle of international law and 
that an uncompensated taking of property is illegal.276  There the Court 
famously articulated the appropriate remedy for a taking: 
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal 
act - a principle which seems to be established by international 
practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals  is 
that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe-out all the 
                                                           
 
271  See, e.g., Rafat, supra note 87, at 51-52; Gordon, supra note 8. 
272  See supra Section II.B. 
273  See RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 6 (R. Lillich ed., 1983); Edwin 
Borchard, , 38 MICH. L. 
REV. 445, 459 (1940). 
274  Chorzow, supra note 260, at 21.  
275  Id. at 5. 
276  Id. 
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consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, 
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution 
in kind would bear; the award, if need be, of damages for loss 
sustained which would not be covered by restitution in kind or 
payment in place of it - such are the principles which should serve 
to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary 
to international law.277 
This passage is important because the Court recognized that the 
principle of compensation for expropriation was established by 
international state practice and prior decisions of international arbitral 
tribunals.278  This text constitutes dicta, however, since the issue before 
the Court concerned the interpretation of a treaty and not of customary 
international law,279 Chorzow is commonly cited for the proposition 
that under customary international law, the expropriating state is 
obligated to provide the alien owner of property full compensation.280  
Numerous decisions handed down between World Wars I and II  
followed the Chorzow opinion.281 
The U.S.S.R. and various Latin American governments 
challenged the international law principle obligating the expropriating 
                                                           
277  Id. at 47 (emphasis added) (This passage is dicta because the 
expropriation in this case fell within the context of a treaty.  Nonetheless, the 
principle of just compensation for an illegal taking, with the object of making 
the aggrieved owner whole, remains a fundamental principle.). 
278  Id. 
279  Id. at 21 (relating to the Convention Concerning Upper Silesia 
entered into Poland and Germany). 
280  Id ich a 
 
281  See, e.g., Smith v. Compania Urbanizadora del Parque y Playa de 
Awards 915, 917-18 (Hale, sole arb., 1929); Shufeldt 
sole arb., 
1936). 
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state to provide full compensation.282  For example, in 1938, there was 
a famous exchange between the Mexican Minister of Foreign 
Relations and the United States Secretary of State Hull, in which the 
U.S. demanded that Mexico adhere to the international requirement 
283  
standard.284  In response, the Mexican government asserted that 
international law merely required that foreign nationals not be treated 
less favorably than its own nationals, at least where the expropriations 
285 
Widespread opposition to the Hull formula emerged with the rise 
of developing and emerging economies after the World War II. 286
Before the war, the opposition was initiated by the U.S.S.R., which 
claimed that an alien in the territory of another state acquires property 
                                                           
 
282  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n.1. 
283  Id.  
284  See, e.g.  
The Government Of The United States Of America And The Government Of 
[Country] Concerning The Encouragement And Reciprocal Protection Of 
 Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered 
investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to 
purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation; (emphasis added) and (d) in 
accordance with due process of law ; and Article 5: The compensation 
referred to in paragraph 1I shall: (a) be paid without delay; (b) be equivalent 
to the fair market value  of the expropriated investment immediately 
reflect 
any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become 
known earlier; and (d) be fully realizable and freely transferable.  
285  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n.1 (citing 3 
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 655-61 (1942)). 
286  Id. 
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solely subject to local law.287  Accordingly, non-capital exporting 
countries argued that compensation should be subject to the 
interpretation by the expropriating state and that an obligation to 
288
Despite the contemporaneous emergence of the rights to self-
determination and the right to dispose of national resources,289 the 
United Nations General Assembly proclaimed that, even in relation to 
natural resources,  
Expropriation . . . shall be based on grounds of reasons of public 
shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the 
rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of 
its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.290  
U.N. Resolution 1803 affirmed the customary international law 
principle that a state has a duty to compensate a foreign national for 
solely according to national law.291  However, the use of the words 
well as the prominence of the Hull formula) continued to divide states 
on the proper standard of compensation required by international 
law.292 
                                                           
 
287  Id. 
288  Id. at § 712 cmt. j. 
289  ICCPR, supra note 255, at art.1; ICESCR, supra note 255, at art. 1. 
290   GA Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. GAOR 17th Sess. Supp. No. 15, U.N. 
Doc. A/5217 (1962) (emphasis added). 
291  Id. 
292  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1, 2. 
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Moreover, in 1974 the General Assembly adopted the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States,293 which also addressed 
expropriation, declaring that each state has a right to expropriate,  
in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the 
State adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant 
laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State 
considers pertinent.  In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under 
the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals 
[unless otherwise agreed.]294 
This 1974 Charter did not specifically mention international law 
or the principle of full compensation for expropriated property.  
exchange that less than full compensation was appropriate under 
is subject solely to national law. 
Not surprisingly, 
standard.295  Capital-exporting states continued to promote the full 
compensation standard as applicable to arrangements made between 
investors and independent governments negotiated on a commercial 
basis.296 
In the 1970s, international tribunals agreed that the Charter and 
views expressing compensation standards other than the traditional 
                                                           
 
293  GA Res. 3281(XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 
(1974). 
294  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1 (citing GA Res 
3281(XXIX), U.N. GAOR 9th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) (emphasis added).  
295  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234
States [was] among the dissenters and the other developed Western states 
 
296  Id. at § 712 cmt. j.  See also, Texas Overseas Petroleum Co. v. 
Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 484-89 (1977) (holding that the 
traditional rule trumped because the capital exporting states had not assented 
to its modification). 
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full compensation standard did not reflect international law.297  In 
1977, the arbitrators in Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company v. Libya 
expropriation.298  As to the Charter, the arbitrator found that its 
abstained or voted against it;299 as opposed to U.N. Resolution 1803 
300  In other words, the Charter reflected the 
political will of developing states, but not a change in international 
law.301 The TOPC tribunal was not an anomoly.  Many international 
tribunals, albeit with different words describing the compensation 
standard, also asserted 
compensation.302  Notably, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
upheld the same standard.  The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal in 
                                                           
 
297  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 2.  
298  Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co., at 468-83.  
299  Id. at 489. 
300  Id. at 491. 
301  Id. at 492-
analyzed as political rather than as a legal declaration concerned with the 
ideological strategy of development and, as such, supported by non-
first step to codification and progressive development of internationa  
302  See e.g., British Petroleum Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab 
purely extraneous political reasons and was made for purely extraneous 
L. Pryor & David L. Schaffer, 
Cognitive Skills, Wages, and the Changing U.S. Labor Market, 50 I.L.R. 344, 
347 (2000) (following a comprehensive analysis of previous arbitral decisions 
on expropriation, the BPEC tribunal held that restutio integrum (restitution or 
restoration to the previous condition) was the appropriate remedy under 
international law). 
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,303 
ed 
304  However, the claims tribunal 
the property taken.305  In a different case, the same claims tribunal 
306 
Moreover, before and after the 1974 Charter was adopted, many 
of the same states that rejected the traditional formulation of full 
compensation entered into a multitude of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) that provided for compensation for expropriation according to 
the Hull formulation.307  BITs are agreements that protect investments 
of nationals and companies of one contracting state party in the 
territory of the other party.  The proliferation of BITs have been 
-
exporting countries considered a continuous erosion of principles of 
customary international law through United Nations resolutions, 308 
                                                           
 
303  4 Iran U.S C.T.R 96, 105, 109 (1983);  Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal: Case concerning the American International Group, Inc./American 
Life Insurance Company and the Islamic Republic of Iran/Central Insurance 
of Iran (Nationalization of Iranian Insurance Company; Compensation for 
Equity Interest Held by American Corporation and Wholly-Owned 
Subsidiaries of American Corporation), 23 I.L.M. 14  (1984). 
304   Iran U.S C.T.R 96, 105, 109 (1983). 
305  Tippets, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran U.S. 
C.T.R. 219, 225 (1984). 
306  Phelps Dodge Corp. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 25 I.L.M. 619, 626-27 
(1986). 
307  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BILATERAL 
TREATIES FOR INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (1977) (listing about 200 treaties 
as of the 1980s); see RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712, cmt. c. 
308  U.N. CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, 9 (1988), 
developed into a deliberate policy . . . to counteract what some capital-
exporting countries considered a continuous erosion of principles of 
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such as the 1974 Charter.  Indeed, the strongest supporters of the 
opposition, Argentina309 and Mexico entered into treaties with the 
U.S., which include the Hull formulation of full compensation.310 
Thus, m
payment of the full value, usually the fair market value.311  However, 
there is no specific formula that provides exactly how the full value of 
the expropriated property should be determined.312  In fact, even the 
United States Supreme Court has bee
313 
attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for determining just compensation 
314  However, there are 
sufficient analogous arbitral decisions indicating that the market value 
                                                           
 
customary international law through United Nations resolutions, such as the 
See also Michael R. 
Reading, The Bilateral Investment Treaty in Asean: A Comparative Analysis, 
42 Duke L.J. 679, 705 (1992). 
309  See Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, The Calvo Clause in Latin American 
Constitutions and International Law, 33 MARQ. L. REV. 205, 206 (1950) 
(stating thIhe Calvo Doctrine provides that an alien may only seek redress for 
grievances before local authorities). 
310  See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and 
Protection of Investment, No. 14, 1991, U.S.-Arg., 31 INT L LEG. MAT. 124, 
131, art. IV(1)(1992)  expropriated . . .  except . . . 
American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-
Leg. Mat. 289, 605, arts. 1110(1)-
investment . . . except (a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory 
basis; (c) in accordance with due process . . . and (d) on payment of 
compensation. Compensation shall be equivalent to fair market value . . . be 
 
311  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 3. 
312  Id.  
313  United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332, 69 S.Ct. 1986, 1090 
(1949). 
314  United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 122, 70 
S.Ct. 547, 549 (1950). 
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315  
Likewise, compensation should be in a usable form.316  These terms 
coincide with the standards of compensation used by the 
Commission.317 
According to the Restatement, a state is responsible for a taking 
without 
318  Thus, under certain exceptional circumstances, 
deviation from the traditional standard may be appropriate.319  The 
R
320   
Proponents of such a land reform exception distinguish isolated 
expropriations from large-scale expropriations, which are carried out 
in pursuit of social and economic reform programs.321  These 
scholars322 maintain that in case of large-scale expropriations, the alien 
would take into account the resources and paying capacity of the 
323 The assumption behind this case for partial 
compensation is that strict compliance with the traditional standard of 
underdeveloped countries to carry out badly needed economic and 
                                                           
315  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712, rep. n. 2. 
316  Id. 
317  See FCSC Cuban Report, supra note 1. 
318  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712(1), n.3. 
319  Id. 
320  Id.  
321  See Rafat, supra note 87, at 53-54. 
322  Id. at 54. 
323  Id. See also GORDON, supra note 8
of England wrote that the tuel which requires a state to respect the property of 
aliens is qualified where there have been fundamental changes in the political 
and economic structures of the state which entailed substantial social reforms 
L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: A TREATISE 318 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948)). 
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324  Thus, it would be likely that in such situations, 
solutions sought by the expropriating state and the alien property 
325 
Whether or not sweeping agricultural or other land reform 
initiatives resulting in mass expropriations justify a deviation from the 
full compensation standard is still a question of international law.326 
However, as dictated by the Restatement, this exception is quite 
narrow, and is not applicable if: 
(i) the property taken had been used in a business enterprise that 
was specifically authorized or encouraged by the state; (ii) the 
property was an enterprise taken for operation as a going concern 
by the state; (iii) the taking program did not apply equally to 
nationals of the taking state; or (iv) the taking itself was otherwise 
wrongful under Subsection (1)(a) or (b).327 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that as of 1987 no international 
arbitral tribunal has applied this exception.328 
Arguably, the land reform exception is more of a recognition that 
in the settlement of certain expropriation claims, partial payments in 
leiu of full compensation is more likely.  For example, in INA Corp. v. 
Iran, Judge Lagergren, in a separate obiter dictum, endorsed in 
principle, a lo -scale 
nationalizations of commercial enterprises of fundamental importance 
329  Lagergren construed this standard as 
allowing a discount from the full compensation standard by 
considering the fi
330  However, no 
                                                           
 
324  Rafat, supra note 87, at 54. 
325  GORDON, supra note 8, at 114. 
326  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 cmt. d. 
327  Id. 
328  Id. at § 712 rep. n. 3.  
329  8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373, 390 (1985). 
330  Id. 
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international tribunal has actually applied the exception331 and no other 
Iran-
dictum.332
There have been numerous lump-sum settlements between 
expropriating states and the states of alien property owners that have 
fallen short of full compensation, but these have not been held as 
supporting any modification of customary international law.333 The 
settlements are usually driven by political and other economic reasons 
and are not due to any exception to the just compensation standard or 
other justification under international law.334 The International Court 
of Justice has described these partial compensation settlements as sui 
generis and proving no guidance under general international 
practice.335
331 RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 3.
332 Charles N. Brower & Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, 491 n. 2326. (1998).
333 RESTATEMENT supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1. See also GORDON,
supra note 8, at 55-
and the compensation actually agreed upon is so wide as to warrant the 
Examples include: 
U.S.-Mexico settlement of 1942, where Mexico paid $24 million for
nationalized oil property valued at $260 million; U.K.-Yugoslavia settlement,
where Yugoslavia paid 4.5 million points for nationalized property valued at
25 million pounds; UK-Egypt settlement for 28.3 million pounds for
expropriated Suez Canal Company valued at 204 million pounds; U.S.-
Rumania settlement of $24.5 million for measures costing $85 million.).
334 RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 712 rep. n. 1.
335 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. V. Spain), 
1970 I.C.J. 3, 40 (February 5). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875,
inheres in the process of negotiation and compromise; we should no more look 
to the outcome of such a process to determine the rights and duties of the 
parties in expropriation matters than we look to the results of settlements in 
ordinary tort cases or contract cases to determine the rules of damages to be 
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Significantly, since 1995 Cuba has entered into 40 BITs with both 
developed nations and developing nations throughout the world that 
remain in force today.336
international law on expropriation and the Hull formulation of 
337
The obligations set forth in a BIT only binds the parties to that 
particular BIT. However, the Cuban BITs are evidence that the Cuban 
for resolution through the application of international law principles, 
as it has done with 40 other countries in the past 22 years.338 The 
Cuban BITs also contain most-favored nation clauses (MFN).339 The 
336 United Nations, UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub/Cuba/BITs, 
available at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/52#
iiaInnerMenu (The developed nations include:  France, Finland, Portugal, 
Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.).
337 See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the 
Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, May 11, 
1995, art IV, U.K.-
expropriated . . . in the territory of the other Contracting Party except for a 
public purpose related to the internal needs of that Party on a non-
discriminatory basis and against prompt, adequate and effective 
Republic of Cuba for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Apr. 4, 
1997, art. 4, par. 1, Arg.-
take . . . expropriation measures . . . against investments in its territory 
belonging to another Contracting Party, unless those measures are taken for 
public utility, on a non-di
measures shall be accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective 
338 See UNCTAD, supra note 336.
339 See, e.g., Treaty between the Republic of Germany and the Republic 
of Cuba, art. 3(1)-(2) Nov. 22, 1998: (I) Neither Contracting Party shall in its 
territory subject investments or returns of nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party to treatment less favourable than that which it accords to 
investments or returns of its own nationals or companies or to investments or 
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purpose of MFN provisions is to guarantee that countries treat each 
other at least as well as they have treated third parties with which they 
have also entered into BITs.340 Thus, in the event that the U.S. and 
Cuba enter into an agreement on the expropriation claims and future 
investments that also contains an MFN clause, it would bind Cuba to 
provide the U.S. the same treatment afforded to the other nations.341
Accordingly, since Cuba has agreed to the use of MFN clauses which 
have bound to the just compensation principle, there is reason to 
believe that Cuba would potentially agree that international law is a 
against it.
If the Cuban government has any defenses to its failure to 
compensate the U.S., they would also be found under international 
law.342 For example, the International Law Commission has 
considered certain circumstances that may preclude wrongfulness in 
expropriation cases, including consent, legitimate countermeasures, 
force majeure and fortuitous event, extreme distress, state of necessity, 
and self-defense.343
returns of nationals or companies of any third State. (2) Neither Contracting 
Party shall in its territory subject nationals or companies of the other 
Contracting Party, as regards their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment 
or disposal of their investments, to treatment less favourable than that which 
it accords to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of 
any third State.
340 Collins, supra note 127, at page 109.
341 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties 252 (2010).
342 See 2 Y.B. INT L L. COMM N 106-36 (1979),  2 Y.B. INT L COMM N.
34-62 (1980); 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 284-369 (1979); 35 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 69-135 (1980); see 2 Y.B. INT L L. COMM N 30-34; 
35 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 59-69 (1980).
343 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, Rep. of the ILC on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf&lang=EF.
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comprehensive reforms to ownership and distribution of means of 
production in history and was the most significant as relates to 
American investors.344 The reforms did not seem pre-planned, nor 
were they communicated prior to the revolution. They were also not 
undertaken through one official act or plan. Instead, there were 
numerous and complex steps taken in light of political, social and 
economic circumstances. Thus, each of the expropriation measures 
was different.  The initial wave was not discriminatory nor retaliatory; 
while, the second wave was, but the third wave was not. . This 
complexity makes it even more difficult to determine the validity of 
the expropriations and the appropriate compensation scheme. On the 
other hand, expropriation claims of foreign nationals have a long 
history in international relations and there are well-established 
principles in customary international law that states have often used to 
resolve their claims.  These are exactly the types of claims that the U.S. 
and Cuba can take off their diplomatic agenda and turn over to a third-
party neutral mediator or arbitrator to adjudicate or facilitate a fair 
settlement.
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK FOR CUBA S LEGAL CLAIMS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
The next inquiry that the U.S. and Cuba will encounter is whether 
or not the U.S. embargo, in its various forms, has violated international 
law.  The U.S. initially proclaimed the purpose of the embargo was to 
pressure Cuba to compensate U.S. citizens for the taking of their 
345
344 GORDON, supra note 8, at 108.
345 See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act, supra note 128.
2017 RESOLVING LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CUBA 203
will in turn determine whe 346 or 
347 under international law and whether it complies with the 
doctrines of necessity and proportionality.348 The international legal 
system allows a large scope of retorsions, non-forcible acts of lawful 
retaliation, such as the limiting of diplomatic relations.349 Such 
retorsions are legal and are not subject to limitations of necessity and 
proportionality.350
On the other hand, reprisals, commonly referred to as 
herwise be 
contrary to the international obligations of an injured state vis-à-vis the 
responsible state, if they were not taken by the former in response to 
351 Throughout history 
346 BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY
retorsion include suspending diplomatic relations, expelling foreign nationals, 
347 BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014) (
with a long history, and modern writers are not agreed on the meaning which 
should be given to it today. Literally and historically it denotes the seizing of 
property or persons by way of retaliation. . .  Reprisals when they are taken 
today are taken by a state, but some writers would still limit the word to acts 
of taking or withholding the property of a foreign state or its nationals, for 
J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 321
22 (5th ed. 1955)).
348 See David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 AM.
J. INT L L. 817, 827 (2002). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 234 at §
905(1).
349 See Draft Articles and Commentary on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2 Y.B. INT L L. COMM N 31, 128, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 [hereinafter Draft ILC State Responsibility].
350 See David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 
YALE L.J
subject to principles of proportionality, necessity, or good faith, the 
mainstream view is that any such constraints are not legal but political in 
351 ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349, at 128.
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states have relied on countermeasures to enforce international legal 
obligations.352  In the last century, countermeasures have been 
recognized by the International Court of Justice353 and international 
arbitral tribunals as legitimate under international law.354  Further, 
countermeasures also apply in the realm of treaty law as stated in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.355  A material breach of a 
terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in 
356 
Under customary international law countermeasures are restricted 
by the doctrines of necessity, and proportionality.357  Countermeasures 
are only allowed in response to a violation of international law358 and 
must be necessary to end a violation of international law, to prevent 
further violation international law, or to remedy the violation of 
international law.359  Unless there is an emergency state of necessity, 
                                                           
 
352  OMER YOUSIF ELAGAB, THE LEGALITY OF NON-FORCIBLE COUNTER-
MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-41 (1988) (tracing their development 
from the seventeenth century). 
353  See, e.g., Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 
7 (Sept. 25).  
354  See, e.g., Air Serv. Agreement of 27 Mar. 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 
R.I.A.A. 417 (1978) (tribunal approved the United States' cancellation of flight 
route, a clear violation of the countries' air service agreement, in response to 
France's disruption of its route). 
355  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, opened for 
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also John Norton Moore, 
Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 Va. 
Int'l L. 881 (1999) (discussing the role of nonforcible treaty-based retaliation 
in international law more broadly). 
356  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60. 
357  Report of the International Law Commission, International Law 
Commission, 56th Sess., arts. 49, 51-53 , U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts). 
358  International Law Commission, Responsibilities for States for 
Internationally Wrong Acts, at art. 52 (2001).  
359  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 905(1)(a). 
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the country imposing a countermeasure must proceed in good faith by 
notifying the other country of the coming countermeasure, requesting 
reparations or resumption of its obligations, and offering to 
negotiate.360
country, although limited amounts of 
escalation may be appropriate.361 Finally, countermeasures may not 
interfere with obligations arising under ongoing dispute settlement 
procedures, like the World Trade Organization system, nor may they 
disregard principles of diplomatic protection of foreign nationals; 
fundamental human rights; the U.N. Charter's restraints on the use of 
force; or peremptory norms such as the prohibitions on genocide, 
slavery, and torture.362 Thus, in order to be deemed a countermeasure, 
the U.S. embargo against Cuba would have to meet these requirements 
to be justified under international law.
The U.S. policy shifts will also influence whether it acted legally 
or not. For example, at first the embargo was a countermeasure to 
obligate 
it to compensate U.S. nationals for expropriated property but was later 
justified  as a national security measure.363
International law provides a framework for determining whether 
economic coercion, such as an embargo, is lawful. The classic 
statement by Emmerich Vattel is that customary international law has 
360 ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349.
361 ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349, at art. 51. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 234, at § 905(1)(b). See also Thomas M. Franck, On
Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. INT'L L.
715 (2008) (discussing the central role of proportionality in countermeasures 
doctrine and related areas of international law). See also Bederman, supra note 
348, at 820.
362 ILC State Responsibility, supra note 349, at art. 50. RESTATEMENT
supra note 234, at § 905 cmts. a & e, n. 6.
363 See Helms-Burton Act supra note 22, at § 6021(14) (finding that 
armed subversion and terrorism such as the training and supplying of groups 
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long permitted nations to conduct trade and economic relations in any 
way they see fit: 
[I]t is clear that it is for each Nation to decide whether it will carry 
on commerce with another or not. If it wishes to allow commerce 
with a certain Nation, it has the right to impose such conditions 
as it shall think fit; for in permitting another Nation to trade, it 
grants the other a right, and everyone is at liberty to attach such 
conditions as he places to his voluntary concessions.364 
This is the traditionalist view.  
of foreign trade to buttress their claims that the exercise of economic 
and political power has traditionally been a matter of national 
365  The historically frequent state practice of export 
controls and other economic and trade sanctions by many countries in 
366  Arguably, there 
is no general rule of international law denying states the power to use 
export controls for political purposes that could have developed 
against the overwhelming weight of such consistent state practice. 367 
The first attempts to regulate the use of coercive tactics between 
countries through international agreements were aimed only at 
regulating military force.368  The League of Nations Covenant directed 
                                                           
364  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 41 (Carnegie Instit. Of 
Wash. 1916). 
365  
Charter: The Question of Economic and Political Coercion, 12 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT L L. 101,105 (1979). 
366  See, e.g., Ibrahim F.I. Shiata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its 
Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT L L. 591, 609-16 (1974). 
367  Shiata, supra note 366, at 609-16. See also Smagula, supra note 96. 
Richard D. Protosky, Economic Coercion and the General Assembly: A Post-
Cold War Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the Thirty-Five Year Old 
Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT L L. 901, 928-929 (1995). 
368   League of Nations Covenant, art. 10. The Peace Conference of Paris, 
1919, 13 AM. J.  INT L L.  159, 169 (1919) [League Covenant]. 
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369  The Covenant prohibited 
states from resorting to war under certain instances.370  However, the 
Covenant did not mention economic or political force as appropriate 
measures to resolve international disputes.371  Additionally, the League 
founded a number of treaties prohibiting certain forms of aggression 
but did not include economic and political coercion.372  Similarly, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928,373 signed by 63 nations, outlawed all 
wars, but made no mention of other forms of non-military pressure 
short of the use of force.374  The 1933 Conventions for the Definition 
of Aggression,375 signed by many nations, including those within the 
presumed as aggressive.376  The only mention of economic or political 
                                                           
 
369  Id. 
370  Id. arts. 12, 13, & 15. 
371   League Covenant, supra note 368, at art. 10. 
372  See, e.g., Treaties of Locarno, 54 L.N.T.S. 289 (1925) (The Locarno 
Treaties consisted of a group of five different agreements: the main Treaty of 
Mutual Guaranty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy 
and four treaties on arbitration. Id. The Treaty of Mutual Guaranty or 
Belgium on the other, mutually undertook that they were not going to attack, 
invade, or resort to war with each other, except in cases of self-defense.). 
373  Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 
L.N.T.S. 57. 
374  Id. 
375  Convention for the Definition of Aggression, July 4, 1933. 148 
L.N.T.S. 211, reprinted in Secretary General Report 7, U.N. GAOR, Annex 
(Agenda Item 54) 34-35, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952) [Aggression Convention]. 
376  Id. at art. 2. Article II stated that the aggressor was considered the 
State which was the first to commit any of the following actions: Declaration 
of War upon another State; 2) Invasion by its armed forces, with or without a 
declaration of war, of the territory of another State; 3) Attack by its land, naval 
or air forces, without a declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft 
of another State; 4) Naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State; 
5)Provision of support to armed bands formed in its territory which have 
invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, notwithstanding the request 
of the invaded State, to take, in its own territory, all the measures in its power 
to deprive those bands of all assistance or protection.   
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coercion was in Article 3, which stated that no political, military, 
economic or other consideration may serve as an excuse or 
justification for the aggression referred to in the Convention.377 
By the time of the Nuremberg trials, the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal,378 named aggression as an 
international crime.379  The Tribunal did not define aggression, but it 
appears from the context of the Charter that the Tribunal only 
considered military action.380  
The U.S. and Cuba are parties to the U.N. Charter,381 which 
obligates states to: 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes 
of the United Nations.382 
The traditionalist view is that the language of article 2(4), as in 
predecessor treaties relating to aggression, speaks only of physical or 
                                                           
 
377  Aggression Convention, supra note 375, at art 3. 
378  Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 
E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288 (Aug. 8, 1945). 
379  See id. at art. 6. Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter in the pertinent 
paragraph states:  The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility: (a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or a conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan.  
380  Id. 
381  U.N. Charter, art. 2, para. 4. 
382  Id. 
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armed force and does not include economic or political compulsion.383
In support of this view, proponents argue that:
Taking the words in their plain, common-sense meaning, it is 
clear that, since the prohibition is of the "use or threat of force," 
they will not apply to economic or political pressure but only to 
physical, armed force.384
travaux prepertoire385 has been 
used to demonstrate that article 2(4) was not, at the time that it was 
drafted, intended to apply to economic force.386 Similarly, 
traditionalist support this interpretation with evidence that the drafters 
of the U.N. Charter considered provisions specifically prohibiting 
exercises of economic and political force, but rejected them.387
Moreover, according to traditionalist scholars, the International Law 
armed force by rejecting proposals to expand the definition of 
aggression in another convention on the grounds that the article 2(4) 
did not justify it.388
383 Under Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter: The Question of Economic and Political Coercion, 12 VAND. J.
TR NSNAT'L L. 101,103 (1979).
384 Id. at 102 (quoting D. Bowett, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 148 (1958)).
385 Travaux preparatoires materials constituting the 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 
234, at § 325 Comm. e. The travaux preparatoires serve as an aid in 
interpreting the U.N. Charter.  The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary 37-38 (1994).
386 Id.; Delanis, supra note 383, at 105-07.
387 Delanis, supra note 383, at 105-06.  For example, Brazil and Bolivia, 
respectively proposed adding a prohibition on the use or threat of use of 
economic force to article 2(4) and including economic measures to the 
definition of aggression under article 39.  Id.
388 Id. at 107 (citing to Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. 
A/2211 (1952)); Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining 
Aggression, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/7620 (1969).
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However, in the 1960s and 1970s certain scholars disagreed and 
should be construed to cover acts of an economic nature by a state 
independence. 389 Most Asian, African, and other developing states 
agreed as illustrated in the following:
The substantial impairment of goals of the international 
community as articulated in the Charter through the deliberate use 
of coercion against other states, not counterbalanced by 
complementary policies relating to legitimate self-defense or the 
sanctioning of U.N. decisions, constitutes a violation of Article 2 
(4) as well as of other provisions of the Charter.390
In light of the political and economic interdependence of states at 
that time, there was a legitimate fear that powerful states could 
pressures of that kind to the point of 
391
Although western states followed the traditional interpretation of 2(4), 
they did not exclude the possibility that certain types of economic 
coercion might constitute an illegal intervention under article 2(7),392
which states: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter.393
389 Paust and Bl A Threat to 
AM. J. INT L L.  410, 417 (1974). For a reply to the 
article, see Shiata, supra note 366.
390 Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal 
Order.51 INT L AFFAIRS 3, 358-71, 361 (1975) [Lillich II].
391 Lillich II, supra note 390, at 358-71, 361
392 Id.
393 U.N. Charter, art. 2(7) (emphasis added).
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The international legal principle of non-intervention is well-
established.  In 1933, the U.S. and Cuba ratified the Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States,394 which provides more generally that: 
in the internal or external affairs 
395 
should be settled by recognized pacific methods; 396 and, 
of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of . . . measures of 
force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive 
397  Additionally, in 1948, the U.S. and 
Cuba ratified the OAS Charter,398 which provides that: 
No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external 
affairs of any other State.  The foregoing principle prohibits not 
only armed force but also any other form of interference or 
attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements.399  
Whereas earlier U.N. Resolutions400 supported the traditional 
interpretation of the use or threat of use of force in the U.N. Charter, 
subsequent resolutions focusing on the principle of non-intervention 
supported the legal prohibition of economic and political coercion.401  
                                                           
394  OAS Charter, supra note 253. 
395  Id. at art. 8 (emphasis added). 
396  Id. at art. 10. 
397  Id. at art. 11 (emphasis added). 
398  Id. at art. 15. 
399  Id. (emphasis added). 
400  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 380 (V), Peace Through Deeds (Nov. 17, 1950); 
G.A. Res., 378 (V),  (Nov. 17, 1950); G.A. Res., 376 (V), (Oct. 7 1950), 5 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20), U.N. 
the Authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an absolute 
all-
was designed to insure that there should be no loophole
U.N.C.I.O. Docs.405 (1945); Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 335. 
401  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), (Dec. 21, (1965). 
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Particularly, three resolutions, adopted in 1965,402 1970,403 and 1974404
formed the foundation for the argument that economic coercion is 
prohibited under the principle of non-intervention. Taken together, the 
resolutions reflect a consensus on some prohibition on the use of 
economic and political coercion that is specifically aimed at the 
subordination  of a exercise of its sovereign rights and the 
securing of advantages.  
Finally, in 1974, as a part of the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States,405 the General Assembly reiterated an authoritative 
condemnation of the use of economic coercion.406
Thus, perhaps certain types of economic coercion for illegitimate 
purposes are illegal, but it is unclear what they are because the terms 
407
402 Id
or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from 
it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights,or to secure from it 
403 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 68 ([1] states shall 
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state; [2] states shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means; [3] states shall not intervene in matters within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state; [4] states have a duty to cooperate with one another 
in accordance with the Charter; [5] equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples; [6] sovereign equality of states; [7] states shall fulfill in good faith 
their obligations under the United Nations Charter).
404 G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), (Dec. 12, 1975).
405 Id.
406 Id
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to 
407 See, ROBERT B. LILLICH, ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE EW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER A SECOND LOOK AT SOME FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS, IN ECONOMIC COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER
prohibitions found in the various U.N. resolutions are pitched on such a high 
level of abstraction as to be virtually
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Likewise, similar language in the U.N.
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the OAS Charter, is 
equally vague.  Thus, the type of economic coercion that is prohibited 
by international law, if any, is unclear.
Further, U.N. resolutions are not one of the recognized sources of 
international law.408 General Assembly resolutions were never 
intended to be binding.409 Generally speaking, their weight as 
evidence of a possible consensus on customary international law is 
inconclusive.410 However, they can contribute to the evolution of 
customary international law.411 The legal effect of a resolution as 
interpretation of existing or evolving international law is easier to 
determine when it passes by a majority of states, is supported by state 
practice, and the form and intent of the resolution indicate that it was 
meant to interpret or codify existing law.412 Arguably, the 1970 
Declaration would bear the most weight as evidence of, at a minimum, 
the progressive development of customary international law.413
However, its vague language does not provide much guidance.
408 Stat. of I.C.J., supra note 234, at 302, art 37.
409 Delanis, supra note 365, at 115.
410 Some argue that the General Assembly resolutions are mere 
recommendations reflecting the political will of the General Assembly and not 
customary international law,; especially since the U.N. Charter only grants the 
Assembly with the power to recommend.  Blaine Sloan, General Assembly 
Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT L L. 39, 52-61
(1988); U.N. Charter, art. 14.  However, even those who believe that the 
General Assembly resolutions are declaratory and interpretive of existing 
international law, agree that the legal effect of the resolutions outside the U.N. 
are unclear.
411 See INT L LAW COMM N ILC Sixty-fifth Session, Geneva, 6 May-7
June and 8 July-9 August 2013, First Report on the Formation and Evidence 
of Customary International Law of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, May 6-June 7, 2013 
and July 8-August 9, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/663 (May 17, 2013).
412 Sloan, supra note 410, at 138. 
413
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In Nicaragua v. United States, Nicaragua asserted that the United 
States violated the principle of non-intervention by ending financial 
aid to Nicaragua, cutting the sugar quota by ninety percent,  and 
imposing a trade embargo.414 The International Court of Justice held 
the economic plane as is here complained of as a break of the 
customary-law principle of non- 415 The Court also noted 
than it sees fit to do so, in the absence of a treaty commitment or other 
416
State practice has not supported a widely recognized international 
legal prohibition on the use of economic coercion.417 Legal 
commentators have listed numerous instances of the use of economic 
coercion, both pre-1970 Declaration418 and post-1970 Declaration.419
Nevertheless, the U.S. and Cuba are parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which governs the 
1982 Ministerial Declaration, the original GATT420 contracting parties 
of a non-economic character, not consistent with the General 
414 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27) at paras. 123-25.
415 Id. at para. 275.
416 Id. at para. 276.
417 For example, in 1973 when Arab oil embargo was in force, the 
of the Arab 
States and Peoples whose territories are under foreign occupation to permanent 
supra note 366, at 619.
418 Id. at 609-16.
419 Id. at 625-26.  See also GARY C. HUFBAUER JEFFREY J. SCHOTT,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 7 (3d ed. 1985).  The United States has 
used economic sanctions to negotiate compensation for expropriated property 
nine times since WWII.  Eight; eight of the nine Cuba being the outlier have 
resulted in settlements.
420 GATT, supra note 66.
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421  The original GATT, was a set of provisional rules 
under which nations were permitted to act unilaterally to impose trade 
restrictions and did so with the power to simply block any adverse 
dispute resolution panel decision that might result from their 
actions.422  However, since 1994, under the new WTO framework, 
unilateral actions in violation of the GATT are subject to its dispute 
resolution mechanism.423 
For example, the U.S. is obligated under GATT Article I of GATT 
equal preference.424  
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges . . 
. shall be instituted . . . by any contracting party on the importation of 
425  The 
U.S. embargo against Cuba, a GATT member state, would violate 
these two provisions because it affords Cuba less favorable treatment 
than to other member states and places restrictions on imports of 
Cuban goods and services.  However, Article XX provides a national 
security exemption that allows contracting parties to suspend their 
tion of its essential 
security interests . .  taken in time of war or other emergency in 
426  Therefore, a contracting party may impose 
protectionist trade restrictions that would otherwise violate the GATT 
to preserve its national security.  Whether or not the U.S. embargo 
against Cuba is or was necessary to protect its national security since 
1994, is a question of international law.  The GATT provides a dispute 
                                                           
 
421  Ministerial Declaration, L/5424 ( Nov. 29, 1982), GATT B.I.S. (29th 
Supp.) at 9, 11 (1983). 
422  Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability for the 
Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based 
Relations and Establishing A New Balance Between Sovereignty and 
Multilateralism, 26 YALE INT'L L. 413, 436 (2001). 
423  Id. at 437. 
424  GATT, supra note 66, at art. 1I. 
425  Id. at art. XI. 
426  Id. at art. XX. 
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resort to countermeasures to resolve any dispute under the jurisdiction 
of the GATT.  
Further, the extraterritorial nature of the Helms-Burton Act may 
violate the international law principle of territoriality.  The 
territoriality principle provides that a state is free to impose laws 
governing all events within its jurisdiction but cannot reach outside its 
borders to impose its will on those outside its territory.427  However, a 
state may enact laws relating to conduct that is outside of its territory 
when that co 428  
jurisdiction is reasonable.429  The reasonableness determination 
requires limiting the exercise of jurisdiction so as to minimize conflict 
takes place.430  This is particularly applicable to the far- reaching 
provisions of the Helms-Burton Act, creating a cause of action against 
alleged trafficking taking place in Cuba by non-American 
traffickers.431  Even if the Act is not unreasonable as it relates to Cuba, 
its application may conflict with the interests of other countries to 
                                                           
 
427  OAS Charter, supra note 253, art. 19; See also RESTATEMENT supra 
note 234, at § 402. 
428  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234
to prescribe law with respect to. . .  conduct outside its territory that has or is 
 
429  Id. at § 403. 
430  Id. at 403 § cmt. g. 
431  Helms-Burton Act supra note 22, at  § 6081. 
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regulate the trade activities addressed by the Act.432  Many states have 
expressed their dismay with the Act for these reasons.433 
D
human rights violations in Cuba,434 the Cuban government and other 
commentators have argued that its impact435 has exacerbated or 
directly contributed to human rights violations.436  Accordingly, any 
                                                           
 
432  Nicholas Davidson, U.S. Secondary Sanctions: The U.K. And EU 
Response, 27 STET. L. REV
by foreign governments as an attempt to extend the United States Cuba 
embargo to companies and individuals outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction, and 
as such as an unwelcome and objectionable attempt to substitute the foreign 
and trade policies of the U.S. Congress for those of foreign sovereign 
 
433   See Andrew J. Rosell, The Future of U.S.-Cuba Relations, A policy 
Shirt from the Helms-Burton Act, 7 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 235, 241-42 (2001) 
(The European Union, Mexico and Canada have enacted retaliatory legislation 
that allows their citizens to recover damages against the United States for any 
Helms-Burton Act.). 
434  Cuban Democracy Act, supra note 130, at § 6002(5); Helms-Burton 
Act supra note 22, at § 6021(9). 
435  For more on the impact on and development of and human rights, 
see Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: 
The Case of the Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 199, 
235-55 (2007); Benjamin Manchak, Comprehensive Economic Sanctions, the 
Right to Development, and Constitutionally Impermissible Violations of 
International Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 417, 432 -49 (2010); Amnesty 
Rights, 15 (2009). 
436  Cuba characterizes th See infra 
St. Rep., at 313 (1997) (State Department reported in 1996 that the human 
rights conditions worsened.).  Human Rights Watch Report 2001: Cuba: 
Human Rights Developments (A 2000 Human Rights Watch Report did not 
show any improvement in human rights in Cuba.); See also Ashleigh Reif 
Kasper, Helping the Helpless: The Foreign Policy Strategies Underlying 
Humanitarian Rhetoric in American Refugee Law and Policy, 32 J. NAT'L 
ASS'N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 309, 342 (2012). 
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437  argument that the United States may 
raise in support of the embargo may be tainted by its counter-
productive effect.  These Cuban claims of counterproductivity are two-
Both sets of rights are protected by the U.N. Charter,438 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,439 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights440 and the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights.441  Specifically, these legal instruments 
evidence that economic and social rights are recognized as customary 
international law.  Further, they also, along with the Declaration on the 
Right to Development,442 evidence an emerging right of a nation to 
                                                           
 
437  See 22 U.S.C. § 6021(26)-
Nations Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994, subsequently 
  This 
law . . . squarely embraces the victims' point of view and interests, rather than 
questionable State-
operates on the following principle: where a state fails to protect its own 
citizenry from mass atrocity (i.e., genocide, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against 
humanity), the responsibility to protect that citizenry shifts to the international 
community. Intervention within this context, thus, is based on a responsibility 
to protect rather than on a right to intervene. Peter Stockburger, The 
Responsibility to Protect Doctrine: Customary International Law, an 
Emerging Legal Norm, or Just Wishful Thinking?, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 365, 368-
exception to the principle of non-intervention for humanitarian purposes 
with  
438  U.N. Charter, arts. 55-56. 
439  G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, (Dec. 12, 1948). 
440  See generally, ICCRP, supra note 255. 
441  See generally, ICESCR, supra note 255 (Although the United States 
has not ratified the ICESCR, it has signed it and is therefore obligated to not 
take any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.); Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.18 (1). 
442  G.A. Res. 41/128, at 186, (Dec. 4, 1986). 
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develop beyond the capacity to only provide its population with the 
bare essentials.443  As noted, even otherwise necessary and 
proportional countermeasures may not violate fundamental human 
rights.444 
Finally, despite the vagueness of the effect of the 1970 
Declaration, the 1986 ICJ decision, and inconsistent state practice, it 
is difficult to ignore over thirty years of U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions supported by almost all developing countries pleading for 
the end of unilateral economic coercion.  From 1983 to 2015, the 
General Assembly has engaged in a consistent pattern of issuing 
-titled in 1997 as 
445 Each resolution has cited 
to the 1970 Declaration, and after 1997, has indicated the following 
purpose:  
[T]o eliminate the use of unilateral coercive economic measures 
against developing countries that are not authorized by relevant 
organs of the United Nations or are inconsistent with the 
                                                           
 
443  U.N. Charter, arts. 55-56; ICCPR, supra note 255, at art. 1; ICESCR 
supra note 255, at arts.1, 2(1); Declaration on Development, supra note 254, 
at art. 8. 
444  RESTATEMENT, supra note 234, at § 905 comm. a. 
445  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 200 U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 71st plen. mtg., 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/200 (Dec. 20, 2013) (Yes: 127, No: 2, Abstentions: 50); 
G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 66th Sess., 91st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/66/186 (Dec. 22, 2011) (Yes: 122, No: 2, Abstentions: 53); G.A. Res. 
54, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 87th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/200 (Jan. 
20, 2000) (Yes: 107, No: 3, Abstentions: 46); G.A. Res. 48, U.N. GAOR, 48th 
Sess., 86th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/168 (Dec. 21, 19931994) (Yes: 
116, No: 32, Abstentions: 16); G.A. Res. 185, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., 119th 
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/185 (Dec. 17, 1985) (Yes: 128, No: 19, 
Abstentions: 7) (These resolutions on economic coercion, the latest of which 
was adopted in 2014, are not law-
concerning economic coercion in the 1970 Declaration.); see, e.g., G.A. Res. 
66/186 (Dec. 22, 2011). 
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principles of international law as set forth in the Charter of the 
United Nations and that contravene the basic principles of the 
multilateral trading system.446 
The most recent resolutions include references to the WTO, 
suggesting economic coercion violates the GATT.447  Ironically, the 
continued need for such resolutions may support the notion that no 
such international law prohibition on economic coercion exists.  From 
its initial adoption, the resolution voting patterns show a distinct split 
between developed and developing countries.448 
In response to the Cuban Democracy Act of 1991, Cuba requested 
that the U.S. embargo against Cuba be placed on the General 
economic coercion.449  Cuba claimed that the embargo was aimed at 
c order which the 
450  The letter focused 
on the extraterritorial effect of the embargo, Cuban sovereignty and 
the principle of non-intervention.451  Cuba issued a second letter to the 
Secretary-General452 stating that U.S. economic coercion violated 
                                                           
 
446  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 66/186 at 2 (Before 1997, the resolutions plea 
coercive measures against developing countries. . . as a means of forcibly 
 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 39/197 at 2. 
447  See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/200, supra note 445.  
448  See, e.g., United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 
available at http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile= 
voting&index=.VM&term=ares68200 (The last 2014 resolution 
[U.S. and Israel], Abstentions: 50 [Most Developed Nations], Non-Voting: 
 
449  See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United 
Nations to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/46/193 (Aug. 16, 1991). 
450  Id. at p. 2. 
451  Id. at pp. 2-4. 
452  Letter Dated 25 October 1991 from the Charge 
Permanent Mission of Cuba for the United Nations Addressed to the 
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453  The second letter cited to the 1970 
Declaration, the GATT and the OAS Charter.454  
he U.N. General Assembly 
economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United 
455  The purpose of the resolution was 
pliance [with] the purposes and 
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, [re]affirming 
-intervention in their internal 
affairs, and freedom of trade and international navigation . . .
express con  [with] extraterritorial effects [that] 
456  The resolution called upon 
all member states to refrain from applying laws that did not strictly 
comply with the enunciated principles and to urge states to repeal any 
laws that conflicted with those principles.457 The first vote, recorded in 
November 1992, was fifty-nine in favor, three opposed, and seventy-
one abstentions (with forty-one not voting).458 
Unlike the resolutions on the general legality of economic 
coercion, where votes have not shifted over the course of twenty years, 
the votes have shifted in favor of ending the U.S. embargo against 
Cuba, as the abstaining countries have changed their vote to support 
the resolution.459  In 2016, 191 countries voted in favor of ending the 
                                                           
 
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 14, at 3-5, 
U.N. Doc. A/46/599 (Oct. 25, 1991). 
453  Id. at 6. 
454  Id. at pp. 5-6. 
455  U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 70th plen. mtg., at 88, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/47/19 (Nov. 24, 1992). 
456  Id. (preamble). 
457  Id. arts. 1-2. 
458  Id  
459  See generally, U.N. Doc. A/48/PV.48 (Nov. 3, 1993); U.N. Doc. 
A/49/PV.45 (Oct. 26, 1994); U.N. Doc. A/50/PV.48 (Nov. 2, 1995); U.N. 
GAOR, 51st Sess., 57th plen. mtg.,. at 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.57 (Nov. 
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U.S. embargo, none opposed, and the United States and Israel 
abstained.460  This most recent version of the resolution added the 
following:  
[1] [S]tatements the  Heads  of  State  or  Government  of   Latin 
America  and  the  Caribbean  at  the  Summits  of  the  Community  
of  Latin  American and Caribbean States regarding the need to 
put an end to the economic, commercial and financial embargo 
imposed against Cuba; -  
progress in the relations between the Governments of Cuba and 
the  United  States  of  America  and,  in  that  context,  the  visit  
of  the  President  of  the United States, Mr. Barack Obama, to 
Cuba in March 2016; [and [4] the  steps  taken  by  the  United  
States  Administration  towards modifying  some  aspects  of  the  
implementation  of  the  embargo,  which,  although positive, are 
still limited in scope.461 
007 report -General462 claims that: 
[t]he economic losses to the Cuban people as a result of the United 
States economic, commercial and financial embargo against 
Cuba, taking into account the depreciation of the dollar against 
                                                           
12, 1996); U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 45th plen. mtg.,. at 17, U.N. Doc. 
A/52/PV.45 (Nov. 5, 1997); U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 37th plen. mtg.,. at 20, 
U.N. Doc. A/53/PV.37 (Oct. 14, 1998); U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 50th plen. 
mtg., at 19, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.50 (Nov. 9, 1999) U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 
50th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.50 (Nov.8, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 62nd 
Sess., 38th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/62/PV.38 (Oct. 3, 2007); U.N. GAOR, 
63rd Sess., 33rd plen. mtg., at 22; U.N. GAOR, 64th Sess., 27th plen. mtg., 
U.N. Doc. A/64/PV.27 (Oct. 28, 2009). 
460  U.N. GAOR, 71st Sess., 32nd plen. mtg., at 31, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/71/5 (Oct. 26, 2016). 
461  Id. 
462  The Secretary General, Necessity of ending the economic, 
commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America 
against Cuba, U.N. Doc. A/62/9268/ (Aug. 3, 2007). 
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the price of gold on the international market, amounted to 
$822,280,000,000.  At current prices, over all these years, the 
embargo has inflicted losses of more than $130,178,600,000.463 
D. CONCLUSION 
Together, the previous two sections demonstrate the United States 
and Cuba have relied on and may continue to rely on international law 
principles to support their legal claims and defenses.  The next section 
provides some guidance on how to best utilize these international law 
principles through diplomatic and legal mechanisms to resolve claims. 
IV. USEFUL PRECEDENT FOR RESOLVING SIMILAR 
LEGAL CLAIMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The notion of one country making reparations to another for its 
violations of legal obligations is not new.464  An interesting 
development, however, is the proliferation of international 
adjudicatory bodies since the end of the Cold War as a result of 
globalization and the expansion of free trade.465  Particularly 
significant is the spread of BITs and international arbitral tribunals, 
which adjudicate individual and state claims by applying international 
                                                           
 
463  Id. at 64. 
464  See Howard M. Holtzman, Mass Claims Processes, 13 AM. REV. 
INT L ARB. 69, 74 (2002) (proving mass claims processes usefully provide 
compensation). 
465  See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT L L. & POL Y 709, 729 
(1999); Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and 
Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC Y INT L L. 
PROC. 160, 165 (2000). 
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law.466  Historically, states submitted more traditional legal claims 
among states, such as border disputes, to arbitration.467  Meanwhile 
individual mass claims against states were usually settled through 
state-to-state negotiations, resulting in lump-sum payments.468  
However, the proliferation of BITs and the wide-spread reliance on 
international arbitration to resolve expropriation-related claims 
provides another legitimate avenue for resolution of those claims.469  
The U.S. and Cuba alone have entered into over eighty BITs.470  
                                                           
 
466  Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and 
Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC Y INT L L. 
PROC. 160-62 (2000). 
467  See, e.g., Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His 
Britannick Majesty and the United States of America, by Their President, with 
the advice and consent of Their Senate, U.S.-U.K., 19 November 1794 
(resolving19 November 1794, U.S.-U.K. (entered into force 29 February 
1796). Commonly referred to as the Jay Treaty, the Treaty resolved various 
outstanding questions between the United States and the United Kingdom that 
arose after the United States declared independence and arbitration was used 
to determine part of the boundary between the remaining British possessions 
and the United States). 
468  Lump sum payments are paid from one government to another and 
individual claims are not directly considered. See, e.g., Claims Settlement 
Agreement between the United States of America and the Great Socialist 
-Libya, Aug. 14, Jamahirirya (2008, 
122 Stat. 2999  (demonstrating how lump sum payments are paid from one 
government to another and individual claims are not directly considered), 
available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/109771.pdf (last 
visited April 16, 2017); Claims Settlement Agreement between the United 
amahirirya 
(2008), available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
109771.pdf (last visited April 16, 2017); Canada-Cuba Agreement of Nov. 7, 
1980, 1981 Can. T.S. No. 18. 
469  U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations, BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 31 (1988). 
470  Id. 
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B. LUMP-SUM PAYMENTS 
In the United States, the president has the authority to settle the 
-sum 
payment.471  This is known as the .  As applied 
to Cuba, this doctrine authorizes the executive branch to bind U.S. 
claimants of expropriated property and provide limited remedies in 
any settlement agreement with Cuba.472  Under standard practice, U.S. 
ernment settlement, and 
dissatisfied claimants cannot pursue their claims before U.S. courts or 
courts of the settling country.473  Although the U.S. is not bound to 
espouse the claims, the Commission report indicates the U.S. 
und by its claims against Cuba.474 
Of the forty-three lump-sum claims settlement programs 
concluded by the U.S. for its claimants expropriated property claims, 
very few provided the U.S. with compensation for the full amount of 
                                                           
 
471  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 2986-87, 453 U.S. 
654, 679-81 (1981) (holding that the President has the power to compel the 
transfer of property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to which a 
foreign country has interest, in the context of a transaction). 
472  See id. at 655. 
473  See Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237, 248 (Cl. Ct. 
1983) (rejecting t
property by the United States), , 756 F.2d 159 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
474 U.S. 909 (1985). 
474  FCSC CUBAN REPORT, supra note 1 
are sent to the Secretary of State for use in the future negotiation of a claims 
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the certified claims;475 and none paid the full amount of interest.476
Except in the case of Vietnam, none of the post-1975 international 
settlement agreements provide for any interest from the date of the 
claim accrual or the date of settlement.477 In the case of Vietnam, the 
amount of frozen Vietnamese assets in the U.S. was sufficient to pay 
the amount of the certified claims with interest.478 Thus, Vietnam 
simply allowed the U.S. to apply those frozen assets to compensate the 
claimants. 
Most of the agreements have also required the U.S. to return any 
assets and property that were frozen.479 Interestingly, despite the 
475 See Shanghai Power Co., 4 Cl. Ct., at 239. See also 2015 FCSC ANN.
Rep. sec. IV, at 32-33. [hereinafter ANN. REP.]
forty percent of the $197 million certified by the FCSC.). See also U.S.
Department of Justice, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, 2015 Ann. 
Sec. IV Table of Completed Programs, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/page/file/934631/download (last visited April 
16, 2017).
476 Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, 
U.S.-F.R.G., May 13, 1992, S.-F.R.G., T.I. A, T.I.A.S. 11959. See Letter from
Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims and
Investment Disputes, U.S. Department of State, to claimants (May 29, 1992)
interest at the approximate annual rate of 3% from the time the U.S. properties
were taken); 11959 Department of State, to claimants (May 29, 1992);
Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, May 13,
1992, U.S.-F.R.G., T.I.A.S. 11959.
477 BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR
SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS, 1975-1995, 23 77 (The Procedural 
478 Id.
479 See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Republic of Albania on the Settlement 
of Certain Outstanding Claims art. 6, U.S.-Alb., Jan. 11, 1995, Ex. Rept. 104-
inform the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold of its 
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the time the claims accrue, (i.e. the time of the taking of property), 
several of the lump-sum agreements have included claims of foreign 
nationals, who, since the takings, had become U.S. citizens.480  Again, 
the U.S. is not bound by these previous settlements nor do they provide 
state practice in support of a new standard of compensation.481  Instead, 
they indicate how the U.S. is likely to settle its claims with Cuba.482 
In a 1992 agreement between the U.S. and Germany, the German 
government agreed to pay up to $190 million, which covered 100% of 
the principal and approximately 50% of the interest of U.S. claims.483  
This agreement was pertinent in two respects.  First, the U.S. accepted 
less than the full 6% interest because Germany rejected payment of 
                                                           
 
readiness to consent to the release to the Government of Albania, in 
accordance with the procedures referred to in paragraph 2, of the appropriate 
amount of gold under Part III of the Agreement of Reparation of January 14, 
 
480  Id. (The Albanian-US agreement allowed the U.S. government to 
-
nationals are domiciled in the United States currently or for at least half of the 
period of time between the taking of their property in Albania and the date [of] 
governments  settled all claims by U.S. nationals against the Czech 
government, allowing claims of persons whose property was expropriated by 
the Czech government between 1945 and 1948 and who became U.S. citizens 
by 1948 to receive a portion of the lump sum. CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CLAIMS 
SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1981, 95 Stat. 1675, Pub. L. No. 97-127 (1981), reprinted 
in 21 I.L.M. at 414.  
481  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 
negotiation and compromise; we should no more look to the outcome of such 
a process to determine the rights and duties of the parties in expropriation 
matters than we look to the results of settlements in ordinary tort cases or 
 
482  ANN. REP., supra note 475. 
483  FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMMISSION OF THE U.S., 1981 
1981. 
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any interest, as it had in resolving property claims in East Germany 
following reunification.484  Second, the Commission explicitly stated 
that interest was to be simple, rather than compound, for the German 
claims,in accordance with previous Commission decisions.485 
Cuba has entered into settlement agreements with five foreign 
countries for the expropriation of the assets of their respective 
nationals in Cuba:  France, on March 16, 1967; Switzerland, March 2, 
1967; United Kingdom, October 18, 1978; Canada, November 7, 
1980; and Spain, January 26, 1988.486  Although these settlement 
agreements were confidential, scholars generally agree that the claims 
were settled at a fraction of the assessed value of the expropriated 
assets.487  The Spanish claims, for example, were valued at $350 
million, but were ultimately settled for about $40 million.488  Even this 
limited amount was not paid until 1994, six years after the claims were 
settled and thirty years after the claims accrued.489  Cuba and Canada 
settled the compensation claims in a similar lump sum agreement 
where Cuba paid only CAD 875,000 in check installments over several 
years.490  These arrangements support the position that due to the state 
                                                           
 
484  Id. 
485  Id.  
486  BURNS H. WESTON ET. AL, supra note 477, at 81. 
487  Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the 
 16 U. 
PA. J. INT L BUS. L. 217, (1995). See also Michael W. Gordon, The Settlement 
of Claims for Expropriated Foreign Private Property Between Cuba and 
Foreign Nations Other than the United States, 5 LAW. AM. 457, (1973) 
 suggest a Cuban 
recognition of a right to compensation under either Cuban or international law, 
but rather an intention to settle claims as a condition precedent to the 
 
488  Ashby, supra note 7, at 421 22. 
489  Id. 
490  Id. (citing to Agreement Relating to the Settlement of Canadian 
Claims, Can.-Cuba, June 26, 1981, 1981 Can. T.S. No. 18). 
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, it would be unable to pay the 
United States adequate compensation by lump-sum payment.491 
C. ARBITRATION 
Recently, however, countries have come to settle individual 
claims through the growing field of international arbitration tribunals, 
which have proven successful in otherwise intractable disputes.492  
Thus, in addition to the traditional diplomatic negotiations and a lump-
sum payment, the United States and Cuba could use arbitration to settle 
some, or all, of their legal claims governed by international law.  
One of the most attractive features of arbitration is that the 
proceedings are generally conducted in ad hoc courts of arbitration 
specifically designed to deal with a particular dispute.493  The parties 
can participate in defining the issue to be adjudicated, retain the power 
                                                           
 
491  ompensation to 
United States claimants to a fractional amount proportionally equal to or less 
than that received by other countries, regardless of the form of compensation. 
See Travieso-Diaz , supra note 487, at 217. See also Ambassador Stuart 
Eisenstat, Speaking on Cuban Claims, National Public Radio (Jun. 9, 2007) 
(settling the thousands of claims pending against Cuba should not be much of 
an obstacle to normalization
economic state, any compensation received by claimants may be little more 
 
492  In the Iran-U.S. Tribunal, individual claimants may present their 
claims to the Tribunal directly in accordance with Article III (3) of the Claims 
within the scope of this Agreement shall be presented to the Tribunal either by 
claimants themselves, or in the case of claims less than $250,000, by the 
Declaration, 20 ILM 230, art III (1981) [hereinafter Settlement Declaration]. 
See also United Nations Compensation Commission, UNCC/What We Do, 
http://www.uncc.ch/what-we-do (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). See also .Egypt-
Israel Arbitration Tribunal: Award in Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba 
Area. 27 I.L.M 1421 (1988).  
493  See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 788 3rd (3d ed. 1993). 
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to select the arbitrators the forum, and designate the rules of procedure 
that will be used to settle the dispute.494  Arbitration also provides the 
parties with the option of holding hearings in secret.495  Thus, 
arbitration provides an appealing forum,because it is much more 
flexible than a court and allows the parties to maintain more control 
over the proceedings.496 
For example, in 1981, the Iran-US Tribunal established a General 
Declaration to resolve the crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and the United States.497  The crisis commenced in 1979 when Iranian 
students held 53 U.S. nationals hostage at the U.S. embassy in Tehran 
and escalated when the U.S. froze all Iranian property and assets in the 
U.S. and cancelled arms exports to Iran.498  By 1980, over 400 actions 
were filed in the United States against Iran.499  In January 1981, with 
Algeria as an intermediary, Iran and the U.S. resolved the hostage 
crisis and the expropriation claims, through two declarations: the 
General Declaration500 and the Claims Settlement Declaration.501 
The countries decided how their claims would be decided and by 
whom.  The Claims Settlement Declaration set up the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal, with jurisdiction to hear three categories of claims: claims of 
U.S. nationals against Iran and vice versa;502 official claims of the two 
                                                           
 
494  Id. at 790-91. 
495  Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party Dispute Settlement and 
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 65, 70 (1998). 
496  Id. 
497  Iran-United States Tribunal, About the Tribunal, (last visited Feb. 
22, 2018), available at https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/A-About.aspx. 
498  CHARLES BOWER, THE LESSONS OF THE IRAN-US CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 
APPLIED TO CLAIMS AGAINST IRAQ, IN THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION 15, 15 (Richard B. Lillich ed. 1995). 
499  Id. 
500  Algiers Declarations (U.S. v. Iran), Declaration of the Government 
of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (General Declaration, 20 
ILM 224, Jan 19, 1981), U.S.-Iran. 
501  Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 492, at art II (1). 
502  Id. 
 
 
2017          RESOLVING LEGAL CLAIMS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CUBA  231 
 
nations against each other;503 and interpretive disputes relating to the 
application of the General Declaration and Claims Settlement 
Declaration.504  The Tribunal consists of nine judges,505 with Iran and 
the United States appointing three judges each, and the remaining three 
judges are chosen by the six appointed judges.506  Each arbitral panel 
is created by the President of the Tribunal and consists of three judges: 
one Iranian judge, one U.S. judge, and one third-country judge.507  The 
panels decide most individual claims, but the President of the Tribunal 
chooses the claims for adjudication by the nine-judge tribunal.508  The 
Tribunal follows the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, and the arbitral 
decisions are final and binding. 509  
Some unique characteristics of the Tribunals are noteworthy.  The 
Tribunal was vested with jurisdiction, not only over certain public 
international law claims, but also over municipal claims against the 
Iranian government.510  Thus, the international nature of the tribunal 
does not limit itself to only applying international law; but parties  are 
flexible to choose nationals laws that are directly applicable, as well.  
Additionally, individual claims against the other country  were not 
based on their respective go
                                                           
503  Id. at art II (2). 
504  Id. at art. II (3). 
505  Id. at art. III 13(3). 
506  Id. 
507  Id. (Third country judges have come from Poland, Italy, Finland, 
France, Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Argentina.). See 
also Jessica Bodack, International Law for the Masses, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT L L. 363, 371 (2005). 
508  Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 492, at art. III (1). 
509  Algiers Declarations (U.S. v. Iran), Rules of Civil Procedure, arts 
IX-XII, IV(I) (May 3, 1983), Algiers Declarations (U.S. v. Iran), 
http://www.iusct.net/General%20Documents/5-
TRIBUNAL%20RULES%20OF%20PROCEDURE.pdf.  
510  Id. at art. II (1). 
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through diplomatic protection.511  In deciding the 1984 Dual 
Nationality case,512 
Algiers Declarations was to resolve a crisis in relations between Iran 
and the United States, not to extend diplomatic protection in the 
513 Thus, the Claims Settlement Declaration expanded 
the universe of claims beyond that contemplated by the customary 
international law principles of state responsibility.  
The Iran-U.S. Tribunal is not without criticism.  However, the 
extremely hostile conditions under which it was agreed to may excuse 
many of its short-comings and justify its characterization as an overall 
success.514  The Tribunal has contributed directly and indirectly to the 
settlement of over 3,000 claims and the paying out of over $2 billion 
to claimants.515  It helped diffuse the 1979 U.S.-Iran Hostage Crisis 
and restore diplomatic relations.  The arbitral process employed by the 
Tribunal highlights the flexibility and adaptability of the arbitral model 
to resolve complex international law disputes between nations with 
strained or non-existent diplomatic relations. 
Critics warn that the Iran-US Tribunal model is not adaptable to 
                                                           
 
511  Diplomatic protection is a situation in public international law where 
diplomatic action 
or international judicial proceedings on h[er] behalf, a State is in reality 
asserting its own right, the right to ensure in the person of its nationals respect 
-Saldutiskis Railway Case (Est. 
Estonia v. Lith.), 1938 P.C.I.J. Lithuania, 1939 PCIJ (ser A/B) No. 76, at 16 
(Judgment of Feb. 28, 2016). 
512  Islamic Republic of Iran and United States (Case A18) (Dual 
Nationality), Dec. 32-A18-FT, 5 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 251 (1984). Iran asserted 
that U.S. nationals who also possess Iranian nationality could not bring claims 
against Iran based on customary international law principles dictating that 
nations can only espouse claims of their own national against other nations. 
513  Id.  
514  Bodack, supra note 507, at 372-73. 
515  Id. at 374. 
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the U.S.-Cuba case.516 First, the Tribunal continues to drag on, now 
for thirty-five years, running up expenses to maintain its nine 
arbitrators and staff.517 Further, a more formal mechanism is likely to 
he process.518 Finally, the Iran-U.S. 
Tribunal has had the advantage of a large amount of funds from Iran, 
,
stream of Iranian petroleum earnings, conditions not present in the US-
Cuba case.519
D. CONCLUSION
One issue with any resolution mechanism between the 
United States and Cuba, be it a lump-sum agreement or arbitration, is 
520
significantly higher than many of the previous claims the United States 
has settled through a lump-sum agreement.  There is no indication that 
the United States will merely accept a symbolic or token amount from 
Cuba in resolution of its claims.521 The Cuban blocked assets in the 
United States are insufficient to cover even one-eighth of the total 
amount of the claims.  Currently, the United States holds 
approximately $250 million of blocked Cuban assets.522 Unlike with 
Vietnam, the United States cannot simply unblock the assets and fully 
compensate U.S. claimants.  Cuba is unlikely to be able to make 
516 Richard E. Feinberg, Reconciling U.S. Property Claims in Cuba: 
Transforming Trauma into Opportunity, Latin America Initiative at Brookings 
34 (Dec. 2005), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Reconciling-US-Property-Claims-in-Cuba-
Feinberg.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2017) [Brookings Proposal].
517 Id.
518 Id.
519 Id.
520 Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 28-29.
521 Helms-Burton Act, supra note 22, at § 6064 (a)-
compensation prior to lifting the embargo).
522 See infra note 552.
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substantial deposits into an escrow account as required to fund a 
tribunal adjudicating 5,911 claims against Cuba.  Thus, any lump-sum 
-
term installment plan.523 
Another issue is the lack of urgency.  The time is ripe for 
continued negotiations with Cuba and a Republican-dominated 
Congress can strategically employ hardline tactics with Cuba since 
they are in a better position to change the embargo legislation.  But 
Cuba will be in no hurry to pay sixty-year-old claims without strategic 
incentives.  U.S. claimants, after waiting sixty years, are not 
necessarily inclined to push Congress to make their claims a 
priority.524  So unlike the Iran situation, there is no sense of a crisis that 
requires urgent resolution.  And, unlike Central and Eastern European 
countries such as the Czech Republic, there is no democratic change 
on the horizon to motivate U.S. investment in Cuba. 
The next section will consider these distinguishing qualities while 
-Cuba 
claims in order to make a new, less modest proposal.  
V. APPLYING PRECEDENT: PROPOSALS FOR 
MECHANISMS TO RESOLVE THE LEGAL CLAIMS 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA 
A. THE TWO MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND CREATIVE PROPOSALS  
Much of the literature on U.S. and Cuba claims focus solely on 
                                                           
 
523  Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 28-29. 
524  See JOAQUIN ROY, CUBA, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE HELMS-
BURTON DOCTRINE 17-162 (Univ. Press of Fl. 2000). (stating many of the large 
corporations whose properties were taken received substantial compensation 
through indirect tax write-offs). 
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claims.525  Most of these papers limit their proposals to only 
compensate the Commission-certified claims, that is, those claimants 
who were U.S. nationals at the time of the taking of property and who 
filed their claims within the appropriate time periods.526  Few 
proposals include claims of U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at 
the time of the taking and whose property was confiscated upon their 
departure from Cuba.527  -
528  
Other papers have addressed the legality of the Helms Burton Act529 
and the destructive impact of the embargo on the Cuban population.530  
But almost none have included or seriously considered resolving 
 potential claims under international law against the U.S.531 
                                                           
 
525  See, e.g., Ashby, supra note 7, at 421 22; Jose Ortiz, The Illegal 
Expropriation of Property in Cuba: A Historical and Legal Analysis of The 
Takings and a Survey of Restitution Schemes for a Post-Socialist Cuba, 22 
LOY. INT L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (2000). 
526  See, e.g., Matías F. Travieso-Díaz, Resolving U.S. Expropriation 
Claims Against Cuba: A Very Modest Proposal, 22 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 3 
(2016) [hereinafter Travieso-Diaz Proposal]. 
527  But see Kern Alexander et al, Resolving Property Claims in A Post-
Socialist Cuba, 27 L. & POL Y INT L BUS. 137 157-76 (1995).). Matias F. 
Travieso-Diaz, Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban 
, 16 U. PA. J. INT L BUS. L. 217 
(1995). 
528  See generally, Alexander, supra note 527; Ortiz, supra note 525. 
529  See, e.g., Luisette Gierbolini, The Helms Burton Act: Inconsistency 
with International Law and Irrationality at their Maxim, 6 J. TRANSNAT L  L. 
& POL Y, 289 (1997). 
530  See, e.g., Richard D. Porotsky, Economic Coercion and the General 
Assembly: A Post-Cold Wat Assessment of the Legality and Utility of the 
Thirty-Five Year Old Embargo Against Cuba, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT L L. 901 
(1995). 
531  But see, Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of 
Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & 
FOREIGN AFF. 199, 235-55 (2007); Bejamin Manchak, Comprehensive 
Economic Sanctions, the Right to Development, and Constitutionally 
Impermissible Violations of International Law, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 
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The most comprehensive proposal is the 2007 USAID Report on 
The Resolution of Outstanding Property Claims Between Cuba and 
The United States ( Report ).532  This Report proposes creating a dual-
-U.S. 
Tribunal established by treaty or executive agreement between a new 
 
constituted as an independent chamber of the Cuban national 
533  The instruments establishing the Tribunal and the 
Special Cuban Court would only allow for property-based claims.  The 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be limited to property claims of U.S. 
nationals certified by the Commission.534  The jurisdiction of the 
Special Court would be limited to the  property claims of the Cuban-
American exile community.535 
a bilateral treaty or executive agreement between a successor 
government to the Castro government and the Court would be an 
independent chamber within the Cuban judicial system 536  The 
argument for the need of a separate Special Court for 
Cuban-American exiles is as follows: 
[B]ecause members of this claimant group were nationals of Cuba 
when their property was expropriated, international law generally 
does not recognize right of recovery.  Consequently, a bilateral 
system to resolve property claims between this group and the 
government of Cuba would not be supported by international law. 
Jurisdiction over their claims would reside within the Cuban 
                                                           
 
417, 432-49 (2010).  
heard at all by the U.S. is irrelevant to the high likelihood that they will be 
raised. 
532  See U.S. AGENCY INT L Dev., et al., Report On The Resolution Of 
Outstanding Property Claims Between Cuba & The United States (2007). 
533  Id. at 5. 
534  Id.  
535  Id. 
536  Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
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judiciary.  While claims by this group are not supported 
specifically by either [U.S.] domestic or international law, 
politically and economically their claims should not be 
ignored.537 
In the Report, neither the Tribunal nor the Court would have 
jurisdiction to hear any government- to- government claims or Cuban 
538  The Report recognized that the 
claims against the U.S. based on harm flowing from the American 
539  But explains that the U.S. should exclude Cuban claims 
l 
bodies sought to be established here should not be overrun by Cuban 
540  Finally, the Report 
claims are allowed, making the claim settlement process a two-way 
street, only valid property-based claims should be considered under 
541 
Other noteworthy features of the Report-proposed Tribunal would 
 one third appointed each by 
the governments of Cuba and the U.S. and the remaining third 
appointed by agreement among the two thirds who have been 
Commission 
542  Finally, a distinction 
is made between small claims and medium or large claims: 
                                                           
 
537  Id. at 4. 
538  Id. 
539  Id. 
540  Id. 
541  Id. 
542    Id. at 5. 
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Small claims are to be compensated monetarily through a 
streamlined process.  Medium and large claims may be 
compensated monetarily, by specific restitution (under limited 
circumstances), or by alternative remedy awarded by the 
Government against which the claim is brought in the form of 
development rights, tax credits, rights in Government-owned 
property, or other remedies designed to promote foreign 
investment if the claimant agrees. Large claims must undergo a 
period of mandatory good faith mediation prior to seeking 
resolution by the Tribunal.543 
As with most other proposals, the Report assumes the U.S. 
property claims will only be resolved in a post-socialist Cuba and that 
a post-socialist Cuba will not assert or need to have its claims against 
the U.S. adjudicated as well.  Ten years after the Report was published, 
one year after the thawing of relations between the United States and 
Cuba, and several months after the death of Fidel Castro, the 
assumption that Cuba will undergo a serious regime change, remains 
speculative.544  Thus, many of the problems with the Report are due to 
its inapplicability under the circumstances as they exist today. 
The Report also assumes that it is necessary to bifurcate the claims 
into two separate dispute settlement mechanisms.  Even if the U.S. and 
Cuban governments agree to apply international law, they are not 
obligated to espouse the claims of their nationals and limit them to 
principles of diplomatic protection.  Instead, as Iran and the U.S. did 
in their Claims Settlement Agreement, Cuba and the U.S. can agree to 
allow dual citizens to assert their claims against the other government 
directly.  Further, they can allow municipal law to apply to the dual 
citizen cases.  Creating two separate agreements and two separate 
systems of adjudication for similar claims may not be efficient, may 
                                                           
 
543  Id. 
544  See generally, id. (It is more likely that Cuba will follow the 
Vietnam or China model of a one-party officially socialist state with a market 
economic.  Thus, more democratic than it is now, but not in the U.S. sense.). 
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lead to absurd results, and will require more political capital.  Finally, 
it is also unlikely that Cuban-American exiles will deem any Cuban 
Court in Cuba to be fair, independent, or impartial, which will 
undermine the effectiveness of this judicial process and the finality of 
any judgment.
Despite the possibility that the U.S. and Cuba can decide to have 
a tribunal hear the Cuban-
for legal and political reasons, the Cuban government is unlikely to 
want to address these claims, at least publicly.545 One such reason 
would be that almost all Cubans living in Cuba would have similar 
claims against the Cuban government.  The U.S. has negotiated lump-
sum payment agreements with other nations that settled its dual-
, and it can do so with Cuba. 
Another problem with the Report, is how unlikely it would be that 
the Cuban government will allow a tribunal or a national court to 
consider U.S. claims against the Cuban government without also 
addressing its claims against the U.S. government.  The Report is not 
only assuming a successor government, but also assumes that the 
successor government will relinquish any of the previous 
a dubious
assumption. 
Moreover, it is also unlikely that if the Cuban government agrees 
to utilize a claims 
will simply agree ex parte Commission 
valuations of the certified claims.  The purpose of a tribunal or a court 
will be to independently decide the merits of the claims and the 
ex parte
decisions of these issues.  The less fair the parties perceive the process, 
the less likely they are to accept the adjudication of the claims as 
legitimate.
545 See Ley de Reafirmación de la Dignidad y Soberanía (Ley 80), 36 
I.L.M 472 (1972).
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The Report does signal an important distinction between small 
claims and medium or large claims that should guide any future 
proposal for the settlement of the U.S. claims against Cuba.  This 
distinction was also noted by Matías F. Travieso-Díaz in his paper 
546 Travieso-Diaz focuses solely on resolution of the 
Commission-certified claims.547 His paper does not assume that the 
settlement of the claims will be with a successor Cuban government; 
so it is tailored to the current Cuban government. 
After indicating that any settlement must take into account the 
fundamental differences in the types of properties548 subject to claims 
Travieso-Diaz goes on to propose a 
four-stage plan.549 Stage one involves direct payment from the Cuban 
government to all FSCS claimants for all claims of $1.5 million or 
less.550 This would provide compensation for all but the 100 highest 
valued claims and would fully compensate 5,811 claims with 
$164,336,899.00.551 With a $164.3 million lump-sum payment the 
Cuban government could compensate a majority of the claimants.  One 
potential source for these funds, or generally for payment of U.S. 
claims are the blocked Cuban assets held by OFAC which total $243 
million.552 Travieso-Diaz, like the authors of the Report, recognize 
546 See Travieso-Díaz Proposal, supra note 526.
547 Id. at 3 n. 2. are
now citizens or permanent residents of the United States; current Cuban 
nationals who, whether the claimants are on the island or abroad; and U.S. 
nationals who for some reason failed to gain certification of their expropriation 
claims under the Cuban 
548 Id. at 11, 135 (explaining that different types of remedies will be 
available for different types of properties).
549 Id. at 14-20.
550 Id. at 14.
551 Id.
552 Id. at 15 (citing Terrorist Assets Report Calendar Year 2015, 
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/
Documents/tar2015.pdf (last visited April 18, 2017). (The 2015 Terrorist 
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that the smaller claims will tend to be for types of property that are less 
likely to be available for restitution to the original owners. 
Stage two would resolve the remaining 100 larger claims with the 
claimants directly negotiating with the Cuban government.553 At this 
stage, the remaining claimants would waive their rights to a lump-sum
and negotiate directly with the Cuban government for more creative 
forms of compensation like restitution in kind, investment 
opportunities, payment in commodities, or payment in state 
obligations.554
The author points to precedent in the U.S. settlement agreement 
with Germany, which allowed U.S. nationals to decline their portions 
of the lump-sum settlement funds and pursue their claims under 
Germany's program for the resolution of the claims arising from East 
Germany's expropriations.555 Potentially, claimants from stage one 
could also waive their right to their portion of the settlement funds and 
negotiate directly with the Cuban government.556
If, despite direct negotiations with the Cuban government, claims 
remain unsettled, then stage three would have the U.S. and Cuba agree 
that these claims be submitted to binding arbitration.557 Stage three 
framework.558 The difficulty, the author points out, would be setting 
up an independent source of f
Assets Report shows that there are $243.2 million (as compared to $270 
million in 2014) in blocked Cuban funds but that figure excludes the value of 
real and tangible property.). 
553 Id. at 16.
554 Id. at 15.
555 Id.  at 16-21 (citing to Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 
53175, 53176 (November 6, 1992)).
556 Id. at 15 n.55.
557 Id. at 19, 20-21.
558 Id. at 20.
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could be satisfied.559  Finally, a hypothetical stage four would allow 
claimants who opted out of the lump-sum settlement not willing to 
submit their claism to arbitration  to proceed in a Cuban domestic 
claims program.560 
The USAID Report and Travieso-
size is helpful for resolving U.S. claims against Cuba.  In addition to 
facilitating payment to most of the claimants, it provides the rest of the 
claimants with the opportunity to pursue different types of remedies.  
561 are less likely to be recoverable or transferred to their 
original owners and less likely to have maintained their value such that 
compensation is the better alternative.  Larger claims, half of which 
are corporate claims, might be better off with more flexible and 
alternative remedies.562 
However, like the Report, Travieso-
the role that the  claim valuations will play in any U.S.-
procedures as fair.563  Thus, Cuba might require its own claims 
commission to evaluate the smaller certified claims and meet 
somewhere in the middle with the U.S. at another valuation or 
negotiate some percentage of the claims to pay out that it may deem 
fair.  Any proposal for a lump-sum settlement of the small claims may 
need to own valuation of the U.S. certified claims 
against it.  Further, it is unlikely that Cuban negotiators will agree to 
                                                           
 
559  Id. 
560  Id. at 21. 
561  Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 19. 
562  Travieso-Díaz Proposal, supra note 526, at 17-20. 
563  See, e.g., Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 22-
counsel to the Cuban government has written that no premium on book value 
should be allowed for going-business value, in circumstances in which a 
change in government economic policies has resulted in a doubtful earning 
capacity for the nationalized entity. . . Going-business value is a very 
substantial portion of many of the losses found by the Commission to have 
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settle the U.S. claims against the Cuban government without 
addressing their own claims against the United States. 
Both the Report and Travieso-
the likelihood that larger claimants, half of which are corporate 
claimants, and the Cuban government will come to a settlement 
through mediation or informal negotiations without the initiation of 
binding arbitration.  The R
require large claimants to undergo a period of mandatory good faith 
mediation prior to seeking resolution by the Court or the Tribunal.  
Similarly, Travieso-
government and large claimants to negotiate a settlement of the claims 
and agree to binding arbitration if they are unsuccessful.  Without the 
strong incentives provided by participation in the process of binding 
arbitration culminating in a binding final judgment, it is unclear that 
the parties will be able to come to a settlement.  Arbitration would 
provide a much needed incentive for the parties to settle, which might 
otherwise not exist for the sixty- year-old claims.  
Further, if any U.S. claimants are allowed to assert their claims 
against the Cuban government directly, they should do so under the 
protection of a treaty between the United States and Cuba that, like the 
Iran-US Claims Settlement Agreement, defines the scope and legal 
framework of the tribunal.  In addition to a claims settlement 
agreement, if claimants are eligible to elect remedies involving 
investment opportunities in Cuba, the U.S. and Cuba will need to enter 
into a BIT to protect any potential U.S. investment in Cuba.  
Alternative remedies will provide U.S. claimants and the Cuban 
government with more creative options for reaching a fair settlement 
compensation to all U.S. claimants.  However, remedies other than 
compensation would require significant changes to U.S. legislation 
and essentially a lifting of the embargo.  Travieso-
that these larger claims be settled last is a prudent a one. 
B. A MUCH LESS MODEST PROPOSAL 
An agreement between the U.S. and Cuba should aim to resolve: 
(1) the Commission-certified claims; (2) Cuban claims against the 
U.S.; (3) U.S. claims against Cuba; and (4) the claims of U.S. citizens 
who were Cuban nationals at the time of the expropriation.  This is a 
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much less modest proposal because it involves the claims of the Cuban 
government against the United States and the claims of Cuban 
Again, whether or not these claims should be heard or not is irrelevant 
to the likelihood that they will be raised at the negotiation table.  
Additionally, certain political assurances and agreements to 
change to legislation must be included in any agreement.  The 
negotiations should be confidential and take place in a neutral and 
convenient setting such as Panama. 
-fold.  First, claims of U.S. nationals 
under $1.5 million can be settled through either a one-time lump-sum 
payment or in installments within 3-5 years.  As it has done before 
with Vietnam, the U.S. can push Cuba to include similar small claims 
of U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the times of the property 
takings and create a separate fund for those claimants.  The amount of 
interest that should be applied to small claims should also be 
negotiated.  The U.S. will likely stand by its  certified value of the 
claims plus simple interest, but it is unlikely that Cuba will accept the 
value without its own evaluation of the claims.  Thus, the U.S. should 
consider, albeit without dismantling the Cuban Claims program, 
allowing Cuba to create its own neutral claims commission or review 
body that would  provide its own evaluation of the certified claims or 
another fair process to decide on the best way to fairly evaluate the 
small claims.564 
All U.S. small claimants must agree to allow the executive branch 
to negotiate their claims and to waive their rights to any other remedy 
other than their portion of the negotiated settlement.  They would not 
have the right to opt out of the settlement so that these payments can 
                                                           
 
564  Id. 
would still provide some useful architecture for facilitating deals in the mutual 
interest of the claimant firms and Cuba. It would have the virtues of a 
prescribed timeframe and lower expenses. It could also provide some degrees 
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be released as soon as Cuba and the U.S. agree on a settlement amount, 
if they so choose.  This would resolve 5,811 of the 5,911 the 
payment of these 
claims would signal to the United States that Cuba is willing to 
negotiate the rest of the claims in good faith.
Second, the remaining 100 larger certified claims would be 
submitted to binding arbitration, the legal framework of which would 
be agreed to through a claims settlement agreement and subject to a 
BIT.565 The goal of the arbitral tribunal would be to resolve the 
outstanding claims between the U.S. and Cuba and to provide flexible 
and alternative remedies and damages to make claimants whole.566
The claims settlement agreement would create a claims tribunal 
similar to the Iran-U.S. Tribunal and would apply international law to 
adjudicate final binding awards, while taking into account lessons 
learned from the Iran-U.S. Tribunal and the particular needs of each 
claimant on a case-by-case basis.567 Cuba and the United States will 
need to commit to deposit in an escrow account an agreed-to amount 
of funds to compensate claimants. 
One important incentive for Cuba to continue depositing these 
its claims under international law against the U.S.  This  will require 
significant potical capital by Cuba to accomplish.  The claims 
settlement agreement would provide the claims tribunal with 
jurisdiction over government to government claims, including over the 
interpretation of the claims settlement agreement.  Thus, the claims 
565 Compare 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 479, with Cuba-UK
BIT, supra note 337
should not be a very difficult undertaking.).
566 Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 32-
remedy options available to Cuba).
567 Although it would mirror the Iran-US Tribunal, hindsight is 20/20 
and the failures of that Tribunal should be taken in to account by: actively 
deciding the seat of the arbitration and whether that law will apply instead of 
choosing default procedure rules to decide; changing the size of makeup of the 
Tribunal t
a five-person tribunal with two from each country, who each choose an 
arbitrator from a third country and those two choose the president.
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If no such agreement can be reached, 
government to government claims could be resolved through a reliance 
on ongoing relations between the two countries, including future trade 
and investment concessions and agreements for certain periods of 
time.  Use of public statements acknowledging some responsibility and 
commitment to future relations between the countries might also prove 
helpful.
Bringing government to government claims within the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal or providing Cuba with trade and 
investment inducements, might also induce Cuba to allow the tribunal 
to decide the claims of U.S. citizens who were Cuban nationals at the 
times of the taking.  Another incentive might be to allow the tribunal 
to apply municipal law to these claims.  The main problem with 
compensating this category of claimants, however, is that they would 
be competing for limited available resources.  Another problem may 
be that current Cuban nationals may raise similar expropriation or 
related claims and cause internal conflict that the Cuban government 
would be unwilling to allow.  Therefore, the claims settlement 
agreement may need to significantly restrict the remedies available to 
these claimants to exclude direct compensation or provide alternative 
remedies.568
The third part of the agreement involves diplomacy.  The final 
agreement must include an agreed upon timeframe to completely lift 
the U.S. embargo against Cuba and repeal all Cuban laws and practices 
568 More research about the interests of this group of claimants needs to 
be done.  Emotional ties to their home, as opposed to other claimants might 
make them more likely to consider other types of remedies.  Although beyond 
the scope of this paper, an alternative for over 1 million Cuban-American 
exiles could involve a restorative justice approach. A truth commission could 
be aimed at the Cuban government taking meaningful responsibility for any 
alleged egregious human rights violations, executions, illegal confiscations 
etc., during the revolution.  At this time, it is extremely unlikely that the Cuban 
government would agree to this, especially considering the current state of 
human rights on the island.  However, this might be a better alternative to the 
changes on the island proposed by the CAFC while maintaining some of the 
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adverse to U.S. citizens and permanent residents.  These changes 
should
the overall settlement agreement.  For example, one such step can be 
-sum payment for the small claims, which would be 
required prior to any steps to repeal  Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act.  
Another option could be that Cuba reverse unnecessary travel 
restrictions averse to former Cuban nationals living in the United 
States.
The agreement will also have to include some assurances by Cuba 
that it will improve its respect for human rights on the island. This 
part of the agreement can involve the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights or other agreed upon NGOs to monitor their progress.  
Similarly, Cuba will likely request assurances from the United States 
to respect Cuban sovereignty and not intervene in its internal political 
affairs.
There are a lot of other opportunities available to the United States 
and Cuba to expand the value of the settlement beyond resolving 
asserted claims.  The use of third party facilitators, like the Catholic 
Church, have also proven helpful in the past.569 Neutral allies, like 
Algeria or The Netherlands might assist with mediating some of the 
processes.  Additionally, there are endless sources for dove-tailing, 
like bolstering foreign aid and investment in Cuba, leveraging 
CONCLUSION
willingness to settle similar claims
in the past shows that they would be likely to enter into a bilateral 
settlement agreement as part of a larger bargain to normalize relations.  
While the Helms-Burton Act and related sanctions regulations present 
a real impediment to such a deal, these laws can be repealed or 
amended; and swiftly, with a one-party dominated Congress.  
569 Jim Yardley & Gaia Pianigiani, Pope Francis Is Credited With a 
Crucial Role in U.S.-Cuba Agreement, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/breakthrough-on-
cuba-highlights-popes-role-as-diplomatic-broker.html.
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and mistrust, no less can be said of its history with Vietnam or China, 
with which the U.S. has normalized relations and settled similar 
claims.  If the United States and Cuba can agree that international law 
governs their claims against each other, then they would also be 
agreeing to fair processes and mechanisms, such as those suggested by 
this paper.  The final bargain should account for all of the parties 
people living in Cuba.  The settlement of the legal claims should fall 
within the larger economic and political goals of the United States and 
Cuba and remain forward-looking. As articulated in the Brookings 
Proposal:
The strategic goals in a massive claims resolution process must 
be political: to heal the deep wounds of past conflicts, to lay 
foundations for peaceful coexistence and the non-violent 
resolution of disputes, to avoid jeopardizing fiscal balances and 
crippling debt burdens, to build investor confidence and 
international reputation, and to help render the Cuban economy 
more open and competitive.  These vital goals will not always be 
fully convergent with the more traditional, legal objective focused 
narrowly on the rights of property claimants. In designing and 
implementing solutions, as claimants bang on doors and demand 
attention, policy makers should not lose sight of their overriding 
purposes.  In the interests of both Cuba and the United States, the 
twentieth-century trauma of massive property seizures should be 
transformed into a twenty-first century economic development 
opportunity.570
570 Brookings Proposal, supra note 516, at 44 (emphasis added).
